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1Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION
Water Resource Development History
The United States during the 20th century has been 
characterized by an ever increasing amount of Federal respon­
sibility and intervention in effecting change in the lives 
of the local citizenery. This Federal intervention and re­
sponsibility takes many varied forms; it is the aim of this 
research to deal with only one of these forms - the Civil 
Works Program of the United States Army Corps of Engineers 
as it relates to water resources development.
It was not until 1824 that the Supreme Court began to 
interpret the Constitution as permitting the Federal govern­
ment to undertake internal improvements in the states of the
, i t
union* Chief Justice John Marshall established that "the 
power of Congress.... comprehends navigation within the 
limits off every state in the union..."1 In that same year 
Congress appropriated the first Federal funds that were 
specifically designated for the improvement of an internal 
waterway. The actual job of making the improvement was 
delegated to the Corps of Engineers. This improvement took
1Gibbons V. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 197 (U. S. 1824), in 
"Water Resources Activities in the United States", Select 
Committee on National Water Resources, United States Senate, 
86th Congress, 2nd Session, July, 1960 (Washingtons Govern­
ment Printing Office, I960), p. 10.
2the form of clearing the Ohio River in order to aid navi­
gation. For the next 78 years Congress limited Federal 
responsibility in water resource development to the improve­
ment of harbors and waterways. This limited the concept of 
water resource development because the whole .emphasis was on 
navigation.
In the 1840*s people of the lower Mississippi Valley 
began to organize in an effort to seek Federal help in con­
trolling the lower Mississippi River so that the flooding of 
fertile bottomland could be prevented. As organized pressure 
increased, Congressional support increased as well. The 
catastrophic floods of 1849 and 1850 made it imperative for 
Congress to act, and they passed a series of Acts referred to 
as the Swamp Land Acts. These Acts allowed the states to 
sell certain portions of public domain and utilize the pro­
ceeds in flood control.
p.
No more significant water resource development legis­
lation was passed until after the war between the states.
Once again in the 1870*s Congress began to make a greater 
commitment. "Between 1879 and 1917, Federal funds were made 
available for some flood control work by the Mississippi 
River Commission, but throughout this period the Congress
insisted that navigation be the stated purpose of these
2 ...........appropriations." 4 i^ajor flood on the Mississippi in 1916
^Ibid., p. 11
3to have been the final catalyst, and in 1917 the first 
clear-cut legislation was enacted into law. Although this 
legislative action broadened Federal water policy, it failed 
to solve the flood control problem.
In 1927 Congress authorized the Corps of Engineers to 
make comprehensive surveys of the Nation’s river basins.
These reports in their final form are generally referred to 
as the "308” reports. They were to become foundation of a 
Federal Action Program that was later initiated by legis­
lation in 1936. The effects of the depression in the early 
thirties led to the acceptance of the 1936 Federal legis­
lation. The depression created a need for work relief projects 
and it placed communities in a financial situation that ren­
dered impossible for them to solve their own flood problems.
With the passage of the 1936 Act Congress had:
1. Established a national policy on: flood control;
2. Authorized the construction of some 250 projects 
and the appropriation of $310 million to initiate construc­
tion, as well as the use of‘work relief funds; and
3. Authorized numerous examinations and surveys, and 
the appropriation of $10 million to initiate these inves­
tigations.
The major elements of the policy that were established 
by this Act are:
1. The Federal government would cooperate with
4"States, their political subdivisions and localities thereof" 
in flood control projects;
2. A two-pronged attack would be made on the flood 
problem. The Corps of Engineers would develop engineering 
plans, and the Department of Agriculture land’ treatment 
plans, for the reduction of flood damages;
3. To qualify as a Federal project under the Act the 
benefits attributable to a project would have to exceed the 
cost;
4. Projects would be recommended in survey reports, 
but could not be built until specifically recommended by law;
5. Non-Federal interests would provide land easements 
and rights-of-way, would protect the Federal government from 
damage claims, and would operate and maintain the flood con-
3
trol works provided by the Federal government. Since 1936 
subsequent legislation has increased the activities that are 
permissible by Federal agencies working in the area of water 
resource development. Such things as recreational develop­
ment, fish and wildlife conservation, water quality 
improvement, the production of hydroelectric power, arid 
the provision of water supply for domestic and industrial 
use are now important considerations in the civil works 
projects of the Corps of Engineers.
3Ibid., p. 12.
5The Problem. As Federal water resource policy has 
developed, a bias which favors the urban dweller has been 
built into it. This is especially evident in the problem 
of flood control. This bias is a consequence of two major 
factors; the first being the legislative requirement of 
economic justification, and the second is a consequence of 
the relationship between human settlement patterns and the 
distribution of the Nation's rivers.
The 1936 Act states: "To qualify as a Federal project,
the benefits attributable to a project will have to exceed 
the c o s t s . I n  the process of economic justification of 
flood control projects, a major source of benefits is derived 
from damages to be prevented by the construction of the pro­
ject. The greatest amount of damages occurs in urban areas.
This is explained by the fact that it is in urban areas 
where the greatest concentration of people and their pro­
ducts (housing, places of business, and places of manufacturing) 
are located. In effect, most flood damages are urban damages.
It follows from this, that the major source of benefits will 
be derived from projects which prevent urban damages.
Major flood control projects are in effect based upon urban 
protection. It is the urban portion of the population which 
receives the basic benefits of Federal flood control works.
^Public Law 738, 74th Congress, 2nd Session, June 22, 1936.
6If a flood control project in the form of a reservoir 
is to be effective in preventing urban damages, it must be 
located upstream from the urban area that it is designed to 
protect# Other considerations in locating a reservoir are 
based upons Geological criteria, land values, drainage 
systems, and the locations of a suitable type of terrain#
The lower the land values, the lower the project cost# Rel­
atively narrow river valleys with flat bottomland provide 
the most suitable terrain for reservoir construction# Gen­
erally, it turns out that the cheapest lands are agricultural 
and the ideal construction locations (river valleys) are in­
habited by rural people engaged in agricultural enterprise 
based on the fertile bottomlands where they reside# Inevitably, 
it is the rural dwellers who are required to give up their 
farmlands, places of residence, and sometimes whole community 
areas, so that downstream urban areas can receive flood 
protection.
When a flood control project is proposed conflict and 
opposition almost always follow. By definition, at least 
two interests are involved in a conflict situation# In the 
case of flood control reservoir construction, the nature of 
the conflict can be seen in terms of sub-issues and themes 
of the larger issue (reservoir construction)•
Historically, the conflict situation has been resolved 
in such a way that urban interests win out over rural
7interests. The rural interests characteristically are 
out-numbered and out-powered relative to the urban interests. 
In addition to this, the urban interests have another crit­
ical factor in their favor— the Federal construction agency 
in the form of the Army Corps of Engineers.
Figure 1
Sub-Issues and Themes in Opposition to 
Reservoir Construction
Sub-Issue Themes
life style rural vs. urban
*
political local interests vs. downstream 
interests
population (size) minority vs. majority
(
economic individual enterprise vs. 
big business
The Army Corps of Engineers has as one of its primary 
civil works goals the control of flooding of the Nation's 
rivers. This, along with the maintenance of the Nation's 
navigable waterways, constitutes two of the major civil 
works duties delegated to the Corps through Federal legis­
lation. Aside from meeting their formal goals, the Corps 
also has a less formally-recognized series of self interests
8or reasons for desiring the construction of projects. The 
Corps, in order to continue its existence, is dependent 
upon the funding and construction of new projects. New 
projects and the funds that come with them maintain jobs 
for the Corps work force, increase the potential for vert­
ical mobility within the organization, and provide the Corps 
with a sense of growth in terms of accomplishment. In light 
of these "self interests", it is a necessity for the Corps to 
push for new projects. In order to obtain enough benefits 
to offset the cost of a new project the Corps must rely on 
projects which are mainly oriented towards urban protection. 
In this way the Corps' self interest coincides with the urban 
interests; the result being a conflict situation with the 
Corps and urban interests on one side and local-rural 
interest on the other.
The planning and construction of a new reservoir pro­
ject is often carried on by the Corps in the face of 
opposition by many local residents living in the proposed 
reservoir area. Such local'opposition cannot be (totally) 
ignored. Correspondence is carried on by the Corps in the 
form of replying to inquiries, acknowledging letters of pro­
test, and in handling real estate matters. Corps repre­
sentatives are located in the field among the local residents, 
real estate appraisers and negotiators dealing with the local 
residents in person. Nevertheless, the primary aim of the
9Corps is to build the project, in spite of the protest and 
opposition on the part of the local people.
In any specific project that is characterized by con­
flict and local opposition, it would seem reasonable to 
expect to find a rationale within the Corps which justifies 
construction in spite of opposition. Such a rationale does 
exist, it takes the form of a common-sense declaration based 
upon a limited amount of empirical evidence. Although the 
specific content of that declaration may vary, it generally 
is expressed like this: “After it's done and over with, they
realize that it was the best thing for them" or "After it's 
done they are glad it was built." In other words, there has 
been a "change of heart on the part of the local opposition". 
This serves as a rationale for the Corps. The working as­
sumption is: The local opponents of a project are unable to
foresee the positive outcome that will result from construc­
tion of the project. The "logic" of the rationale goes 
something like this:
We know that in past projects, after it was all 
over, the people that originally opposed the project 
ended up being glad it was built. They realized that 
they were a lot better off because of it. They have 
a good water recreation area and the reservoir has 
enhanced the economic value of the area. The same 
will be true in this case. Even though they may 
be opposed now, we'll proceed to construct the 
project since we know, and they will eventually 
know that when it's finished, they will be better 
off.
There are two major implications contained in this rationale.
10
First, it implies that the attitudes of the local opponents
5toward the project change over time. Prior to and during
■f the construction the opponents possess a negative set of
! ' . .attitudes about the project. After the project is completed
these same people possess a positive set of attitudes toward 
the project. Attitude change from a negative to a positive 
state has occurred. The second of these two implications 
is derived from the generalized way in which the rationale
\
is expressed. The rationale is m  fact expressed as a gen­
eralization. No room is left for variation as to the degree 
of change, nor is there any consideration given to the 
possibility that only certain people may change their atti­
tudes. The generalization is applied to all of the local 
people who were affected as if they all responded in the same 
way and subsequently changed their attitudes in the same way.
One would expect to find a universal set of positive 
attitudes of similar intensity only if all the people affected 
by the project responded to it in the same way and experienced 
the same consequences as a result of their response. If, on 
the other hand, the people who were directly affected by a 
project respond to the project in different ways, and if they 
experience different consequences as a result of their re­
sponse, it would seem reasonable to expect to find variations
s .Attitude as it is used throughout this thesis refers to 
an individual's feelings, thoughts, and predispositions to act 
toward some aspect of his environment. See Paul F. Secord and 
Carl W. Backman, Social Psychology, (New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Company, 1964), p. 97.
11
in the attitudes that they have toward the project at the 
present time.
The rationale that the local opponents change their 
attitude to a position that favors the fact of reservoir 
construction is supported by the generalized form in which 
it is expressed. Its functional attributes are similar to 
those of a stereotype. By referring to all-inclusive 
categories, no attention is given to exceptions to the gen­
eral proposition. For the rationale to be really effective 
it must be general.
The topical area under consideration has been defined 
so far as attitude change, but attitude change to this point 
is only a possibility. It has already been pointed out that 
the "common-sense” assumption is that persons who (oppose and) 
have a negative set of attitudes about a reservoir, change 
thier attitude set to a positive or favorable position once 
the reservoir is constructed. More is involved than attitude 
change. Reservoir construction which requires resettlement 
and relocation affects changes in patterns of behavior.
The basis for much of the opposition surrounds the issues
of losing one's farmland or community, displacement, and re-
6 , 
location. When governmental exercise of the power of eminent
% .  Stuart Chapin, Jr., "In the Shadow of a Defense 
Plants A Study of Urbanization in Rural South Carolina", in 
The Impact of Large Installations on Nearby Areas, ed. Gerald 
Breese and. others, (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, Inc.,
1965), pp. 483-484.
12
domain results in the displacement of people, important con­
sequences result in a disruption of the life pattern of the
\
group so affected. Certain inevitable adjustments must be 
faced regardless of the size of the group affected, its 
social characteristics, or the actual reason requiring the 
population removal. It need not be assumed that the. changes 
produced by relocation are, of necessity, undesirable or 
tragic. Nevertheless, virtually all daily routines are dis­
rupted for a time and frequently permanent changes are made 
in basic aspects of personal and community life.
Relocation disrupts normal activity in earning a living 
among many of the people to be moved. Persons whose liveli­
hood has been derived from farming or other direct use of 
natural resources of the area to be taken face actual sepa­
ration from the economic base. Likewise, merchants, 
manufacturers, and professionals such as lawyers and doctors 
must relocate their equipment and activities, and, not un­
commonly, they are confronted with dispersal of both labor 
force and clientele. For some, this results in leaving old 
livelihoods and seeking new employment. Others set out to 
re-establish themselves in their former occupations at new 
locations•
In situations where whole communities are to be removed 
from an area, most formal and informal associational groupings 
are subjected to severe stress and may dissolve. If most of
13
the residents of a community decide to relocate as a group, 
it is possible for many of the mutual dependency and mutual 
aid customs to serve during the difficult days of the move.
If, on the other hand, no such decision is made, families 
work out thier plans individually, and relatively few com­
munity patterns of mutual assistance continue to function. 
Neither the local government nor other organizations can 
exercise a leadership role when the upheval of relocation 
fractures communities into small groups of individual families 
which disperse both physically and interest-wise. In such 
situations new leadership may emerge; the land-speculator or 
the real estate development agent may exert far more in­
fluence on where people relocate than the community's former 
leaders, who become immersed in their own personal relocation 
problems•
Removal of communities from an area raises administrative 
and fiscal questions for formally organized community insti­
tutions. For example, church organizations, school boards, 
and lodges receive compensation for the physical property 
taken. Where communities relocate as groups, it is difficult 
to build or acquire new facilities with the compensation re­
ceived for depreciated, older property. When people disperse 
and communities dissolve in relocation, institutional trustees 
must make arbitrary decisions as to the disposal or invest­
ment of the funds received from government acquisition of
14
their property. These decisions are often controversial.
No aspect of the relocation process is more important 
or more complex than the uprooting of families resident in 
the area to be taken. For many, there are strong sentimental 
ties. Families long resident in an area may be faced with 
conflicts as they weigh the problems of moving to a-new 
location.
For example, they must often decide between staying 
near family and old friends or a move to an entirely new en­
vironment to seek a livelihood. Decisions must be made as to 
whether the old dwelling will be relocated, if possible, or 
whether a new dwelling should be built or purchased. The- 
actual physical move itself, with its work and upsetting cir^ 
cumstances, becomes a major task. The full effect of 
relocation cannot be evaluated for a particular family until 
it is known whether or not the family is reasonably satisfied 
in its new location, and what this relative satisfaction means 
to the personal adjustment of the family members.
In the case of reservoir construction which brings about 
forced resettlement, it seems reasonable to deal with attitude 
change in the context of behavioral change. Whereas attitude 
change to this point can be only an assumption, behavioral 
change is a certainty. Forced resettlement, as a consequence 
of governed acquisition of lands, requires a migration decision 
on the part of the individuals whose land has been acquired.
15
The individual who is faced with the problem of resettlement 
may have migration alternatives available to him# Each alter­
native requires a different amount of behavioral change# A 
hypothetical example may help to clarify this point# Take the 
case of a farmer who is faced with the problem of migration. 
Even if this farmer elects to move to another farm, behavioral 
change will take place# Patterns of interaction with old 
neighbors may change in terms of frequency and quality# New
patterns of interaction with new neighbors may emerge# The
physical aspects of the new farm may require changes in farm
practice and operations. These, too, will be reflected in
behavioral changes# If the farmer chooses either the rural 
nonfarm or urban situations, a greater amount of behavioral 
change will take place. For example, in an urban situation, 
an occupational change or change in employment status will 
probably take place# Patterns of social participation and 
life styles will also probably change.
Figure 2
Migration Alternatives and Behavioral Change
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The reason for this discussion of behavioral change as 
a consequence of migration is to place the assumption of 
attitude.change in context. It has already been pointed out 
that the assumption of attitude change from negative to posi­
tive was applied in a general way to all those directly 
affected by reservoir construction. But, in the case of 
resettlement, not all people select the same migration alter­
native. Some choose to remain on a farm; others to move to 
a small town or large city:. Different migration alternatives 
and decisions result in different experiences and in different 
behaviors. In light of these behavioral differences it seems 
doubtful that the assumption of attitude change from a nega­
tive to positive state (about a reservoir project) can be 
successfully expressed as a generalization for all those who 
are required to resettle. The problem then is not simply one 
of attitude change but also of behavioral change; therefore, 
they should be studied together. This then is the basic aim 
of the thesis: To study the relationship between attitude
change and behavioral change in a forced-resettlement situation. 
Three other questions of interest also to be dealt with are:
1. Do the attitudes of local opponents to Corps reser­
voirs change over time from a negative to a positive position?
,2. Is there any variation as to who changes and how 
much they change, i.e., does the generalization hold?
3. What specifically are the bases for variations of 
attitude change and the intensity with which an attitude is 
held? In order to deal adequately with the attitude change - 
behavioral change topic, the guidance of theory is utilized.
17
Chapter 2
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Attitudes and Behavior
Having stated that the basic topic under study is the 
relationship between attitude change and behavioral change, 
the problem becomes one of arriving at an adequate theory 
which is capable of dealing with that relationship. Before 
doing this though, a review of the thought on the relation­
ship between attitudes and behavior is in order,
"It is commonly assumed that attitudes and behaviors
7are closely related m  natural settings". But historically 
there have been a number of studies which have demonstrated 
that attitudes and behavior are often inconsistent, LaPiere 
conducted a study dealing with the apparent inconsistency
t
between attitudes and behavior created when motel and res­
taurant proprietors actually served a Chinese couple even
8though they said they would not do so when asked by letter. 
Minoid found obvious differences in patters of social behavior 
during working hours in the coal mine and non-working hours
7 .Charles A. Kiesler, Barry E. Collins, and Norman Miller, 
Attitude Change (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1969),
Pt 23.
O
Richard T. LaPiere, "Attitudes versus Action", Social 
Forces, 13 (December 1934), pp. 230-237.
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9in the community. Almost 60 percent of the white miners 
were (apparently) free from prejudice when they were working 
with Negroes in the mine. When they returned from work to 
the community the same 60 percent shifted their role and 
status and were prejudicial.
These two research examples are often used to support 
the ideas that attitudes and behavior may be inconsistent. 
Kiesler, Collins, and Miller maintain that "What we actually 
have here is not an inconsistency between attitudes and be­
havior. If anything, it is an 'inconsistency* between 
behavior in two different situations."1 *^ In the case of 
LaPiere, the accepting or rejecting of a request for reser­
vations can be considered as overt behavior on the part of 
the interpreter, thus rejecting a reservation request and 
later serving the same couple is an "inconsistency" between 
two different behavior situations.
On the other hand, a good deal of evidence exists for 
attitude-behavior consistency, Studies by Nettler and Golding 
and by Sherif and Hovland provide such evidence.11 Nettler
9 . . . .Ralph D. Mmard, "Race Relationships m  the Pocohontas
Coal Field", Journal of Social Issues, 8 (1952), pp. 29-44.
■^Kiesler, Collins, and Miller, op. cit., p. 25.
11Gueynne Nettler and Elizabeth H. Golding, "The Measure­
ment of Attitudes Toward the Japanese in America", American 
Journal of Sociology. 42 (July 1946), pp. 31-39. See also 
Muzafer Sherif and Carl I. Hovland, Social Judgment: Assimi­
lation and Contrast Effects in Communication and Attitude 
Change, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), pp. 179-183.
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and Golding found that items of their Thurstone scale on
attitudes toward the Japanese successfully descriminated
between members of avidly pro-Japanese and members of avidly
anti-Japanese organizations. Sherif and Hovland found that
joiners of prohibitionistic organizations indicated attitudes
significantly different from joiners of other organizations.
The consistency-inconsistency issue still exists.
Data is available with which to support either side of the
question. Nevertheless, many social scientists have accepted
consistency as a working principle. For example, Secord
and Backman states "One of the prevailing characteristics
of human thought and behavior is the tendency to be consis- 
12
tent.” They go on to say that:
Serious thinkers throughout the ages have often 
referred to the consistency in human thought, 
feelings, and behavior, but only in recent years 
have behavioral scientists given serious atten­
tion -to this c o n c e p t .  ^
Summer, Wertheimer, Kohler, Koffka, and Lewis and Kecky are 
discussed as historic examples of men who have worked with 
the concept of consistency. . Roger Brown is in concurrence.
He states:
The human mind, it seems, has a strong need for 
consistency, and attitudes are generally changed 
in order to eliminate some inconsistency.14
■^Paui, F. Secord and Carl W. Backman, Social Psychology, 
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), p. 109.
■^Ibid.
14Roger Brown, Social Psychology. (New York: The Free
Press, 1965), p. 549.
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Though the "principle of consistency" has had a place 
in the history of behavioral science for a period of several 
years, it has only been in the last two decades that it has 
become the basis for systematic theories of attitude organ­
ization and attitude change. The principle of consistency 
as an organizing principle is used in different ways by 
different theorists. Although there is not complete agree­
ment about the definition of the concept of attitude, most 
have come to recognize and accept the notion that there are 
three components of the concept which are:
1. The affective component or feelings;
2• The cognitive component or thoughts; and
. . 153. The behavioral component or predisposition to act.
A review of the writings of major theorists discloses different
ways in which the principle is used. It is used by some in a
broad fashioh to connote consistency between one’s knowledge,
attitudes, and behavior. It has already been pointed out that
the consistency principle has become the basis for much formal
theorizing about attitude organization and change. Before a
theorists can ask how attitudes change, he must first deal with
the question of how attitudes are organized.
Theories of Attitude Organization
Secord and Backman have provided a concise summary of
\.
-^Secord and Backman, op. cit., p. 97.
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the major theoretical developments based on consistency.
Figure 3
Theories of Attitude Organization
HEIDER (1946, 1958) - A theory of balance. A positive 
or negative affect toward another person tends to be in a 
state of balance with an individual's affect toward an 
attitude object toward which the other person is also ori­
ented, A state of balance is achieved either when the 
three signs of the relations are all positive or when two 
are negative. Balance and imbalance are related to cogni­
tive structure, affect, person perception, influence, and 
attitude-change process.
NEWCOMB (1953) - A theory of symmetry in interpersonal 
communication, A person's attitude toward an object may be 
positive or negative; persons may be positively or negatively 
attracted to each other. These relations may also vary in 
intensity. Symmetry between two persons exists when signs 
of attraction are alike, signs of attitude are alike, and 
intensities are equal. Dissimilar but complementary re­
lations of two persons toward an object may also be symmet­
rical. A variety of group processes are treated in terms of 
the theory.
OSGGO and TANNENBAUM (1955) - A theofy of congruity. 
Cognitive elements have positive, negative, or zero valence 
of varying intensity. Elements relevant to each other may 
also be positively or negatively related. Congruity exists 
when signs are all zero, or two are negative, and when in­
tensities are equal. Cognitive structures and attitude 
change are treated in terms of the theory.
CARTWRIGHT and HARARY (1956) HARARY (1959) - A formal­
ization and elaboration of Heider's theory in terms of 
mathematical theory of linear graphs. Takes into account 
more than three elements.
16Secord and Backman, op. cit., p. 110.
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Figure 3 (continued)
FESTINGER (1957) - A theory of cognitive dissonance.
Two cognitive elements are dissonant with respect to each 
other if the obverse of one element follows from the other. 
The existence of dissonance gives rise to pressures to re­
duce it. Processes of dissonance reduction are related to 
cognitive or behavioral changes.
McGUIRE (1960) - A two-process theory of consistency. 
"Wishful thinking" is the tendency for the subjective 
probability of a proposition to be consistent with its de­
sirability, and "logical thinking" is the tendency for a 
person*s beliefs to relate to each other in the accord with 
the rules of formal logic.
ROSENBERG AND ABELSON (1960) - An extension of Heider*s 
theory, which provides for positively - and negatively- 
signed elements as well as positively- and negatively-signed 
relations, takes into account more than three elements. The 
theory is very similar to Cartwright and Harary's system 
but is expressed in terms of matrix theory.
KATZ and STOTLAND (1959) - A theory of attitude change 
based upon four motivational bases for attitudes The ad- 
justive function, the ego-defensive function, and the 
value-expressive function, and the knowledge function. Only 
the value-expressive function and the knowledge function 
make direct use of a consistency principle..
KELMAN (1969) - A three-process theory of attitude 
change. Compliance occurs as a result of reward or punish­
ment by the influence agent, identification occurs through 
formation of a satisfying relation to the influence agent, 
and internalization occurs when the change is congruent with 
one's values. Only internalization makes use of a consis­
tency principle.
Among these theoretical developments, the work of 
Heider, Newcomb, Osgood and Tannenbaum, Cartwright and 
Harary, Rdseriberg and Abelsen, and Festinger stand out in
terms of the treatment they have received by others, and
t
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in terms of the influence they have had upon research. Brown 
implies that the theories of attitude organization and change 
which make use of the consistency principle can be sub­
categorized in terms of "three systematic uses" of the 
consistency principle.1*^ Out of these three uses of the 
principle three major models have developed? these are the 
congruity, balance, and dissonance models.
Figure 4 
Three Major Consistency Models
Conditions of Equilibrium 
Model Major Theorists Conditions of Disequilibrium
Congruity Osgood
Suci
Tannenbaum
Congruity— Incongruity
Balance Heider Balance— Imbalance
Rosenberg
Cartwright.
Horary
Newcomb
*
Dissonance Festinger Consonance— Dissonance
The three models differ on numerous points, but at the 
same time are in agreement with one another on basic points. 
The most obvious common characteristic is that all three
1^Brown, op. cit., p. 550.
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models are based upon the consistency principle. All recog­
nize the disequilibrium of inconsistency as the factor that 
initiates change. They agree that change is in the direction 
of equilibrium or consistency.
Osgood finds a consensus among the theorists in the
way in which they treat the interaction of the cognitive
components of attitudes (knowledge or belief-disbelief).
Hollander, in paraphrasing Osgood's summary, recognizes four
18common principles of cognitive interaction. These ares
1. Modification of cognitive structures, i.e., attitude 
change results from the psychological stress produced by cog­
nitive inconsistency.
2. The interaction of cognitive elements depends upon 
their being brought into some kind of confrontation with one 
another•
3. The magnitude of stress toward attitude change in­
creases with the degree of cognitive inconsistency.
4. The dynamics of cognitive interaction under stress 
operate to reduce total cognitive inconsistency.
All three of the major models then are based on the
■^Charles E. Osgood, "Cognitive Dynamics in the Conduct 
of Human Affairs," Public Opinion Quarterly. 24 (Summer 1960), 
pp. 341-365; cited by Edwin P. Hollander, Principles and 
Methods of Social Psychology. (New Yorks Oxford University 
Press, 1967), p. 154.
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assumption that attitudes are organized so as to be con­
sistent with one another* Inconsistency, when it arises, 
is a motivating force for attitude change which occurs in 
the direction of achieving consistency. The characteristics 
that these three models have in common have been summarized. 
Now the question is "How do they work?"; or stated in a 
different way, "How does each model deal with the dynamics of 
attitude change?" This question will be dealt with by 
briefly reviewing the congruity and balance models. The
dissonance model will be dealt with in greater detail. It
\
has the merit of linking attitude to overt behavior. Because 
of this, it is the most useful in dealing with the basic re­
search problem; the relationship between attitude change and 
behavioral change.
The Balance Model1^
The balance model is concerned mainly with the relation­
ship among three cognitive elements in a given person's 
phenomenological world. Cognitive elements can be either 
concrete or abstract. Cognitive elements are such things 
as persons, institutions, traits, grounds, and practices.
The three cognitive elements in the relationship are two 
persons, a Perceiver and an Other, and an Object (P = per-
19The balance model as it is reviewed here is mainly 
concerned with the original work of Fritz Heider as it appears 
in Fritz Heider, "Attitudes and Cognitive Organization",
Journal of Psychology, 21 (January 1946), pp. 107-112. See 
also Fritz Heider, The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations. 
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1958).
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ceiver, O = Other, and X = Object) for which either the 
perceiver or other can hold an attitude. There are two 
types of relationships that can possibly exist between each 
pair of cognitive relations. These are the liking relation 
and the unit relation. The liking relation is relatively 
simple. The perceiver either likes the object or the per­
ceiver does not like the object. The liking relation is a 
dichotomous relation. The unit relation is not quite as 
simple. Heider describes it when he says, "Separate entities 
comprise a unit when they are perceived as belonging together.
For example, members of a family are seen as a unit; a per-
20
son and his deed belong together." Unit relations are 
relations which are formed by the perception of cognitive 
elements as belonging together.
The central theoretical concept, balance, is defined
by Heider as "... a situation in which the perceived units
» - 
and the experienced sentiments (liking relations) co-exist
21
without stress". A balanced state would be a situation m  
which P is positive toward 0 and X, and 0 is perceived as 
being positive toward X as well. All three relationships 
in this example are positive. Balance can also exist when 
two of the relationships are negative and one is positive.
An example of this would be a situation where P likes 0, P
^Fritz Heider, The Psychology of Interpersonal Re­
lations. (New Yorks John Wiley and Sons, 1958), p. 176.~
^Ibid.
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dislikes X, and 0 dislikes X. Combinations other than these 
two result in an imbalanced state. Heider maintains that, 
"There is always movement to a balanced state, that is, a 
situation in which the relations among the entities fit
22together harmoniously; there is no stress toward change". 
Balanced states resist change and unbalanced states change 
to bring about balance. Attitude change occurs because
"there is a tendency for individuals to resolve attitudes
. . . 23which are not similarly signed".
Although the balance model, (Heider in particular), 
has emphasized situations characterized by three cognitive 
elements, it also treats situations characterized by two- 
cognitive elements. The two-element situation is the case 
where a relationship exists between two people or one person 
and an object. Kiesler, Collins, and Miller give the follow­
ing example of change in the two-element situation
... the state P likes 0 •induces* (produces a 
force toward or a tendency toward a particular state 
rather than actual production of the state). 0 
likes P. P owns X (the unit relationship des­
ignated by U) induces'P likes X. If P likes 0 
and 0 does not like P, a state of unbalance 
exists. Other things being equal, and assuming 
that 0 continues to dislike P, then P should 
come to dislike 0.
22Ibid., p. 201.
Hollander, op. cit., p. 155.
^Kiesler, Collins, and Miller, op. cit., p. 159.
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In this example the phrase "other things being equal" is 
extremely important. Even in the two-element situation, 
a liking relationship or a unit relationship can be extreme­
ly complex. Perhaps the most critical problem is that the 
■model assumes, in the above example, that 0*s liking for P 
disappears simply because a third object (X) enters the 
field. There seems to be very little grounds for making 
such an assumption.
The research generated by this model is in general 
inconclusive. ' Jordan, using a role-playing technique,
found that on the average subjects rate balanced situations
25
as .more pleasant than unbalanced ones. Burdick and Barnes,
using GSR ratings as an indicator of tension, found greater
tension exists when a subject disagreed with someone whom he
2 5
liked (a situation of unbalance)• They also found that 
subjects who liked the experiments changed'their attitudes 
toward the position of the experimenter. This outcome is 
predictable by the balance model but also by all other con­
sistency models, Other research has produced results which
27are quite inconsistent with the model.
Nehemiah Jordan, "Behavioral Forces that are a 
Function of Attitudes and of Cognitive Organization", Human 
Relations, 8 (1953), pp. 273-287.
2£>H, Burdick and Arnold J. Burnes, "A Test of Strain 
Towards Symmetry Theories", Journal of Abnormal and Social 
Psychology, 57 (June 1958), pp. 367-372.
2 7 ' *■Harold B. Gerard and Leonard Fleischer,. "Recall and
Pleasantness of Balance and Unbalanced Cognitive Structures",
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 7 (June 1967),
pp. 332-337.
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Although many criticisms of the balance model can be 
made, only four major criticisms will be mades
1, Given a state of unbalance where attitude change 
occurs in the direction of balance, it is not very clear 
exactly how this change takes place# There are a number of 
possible alternative ways, but they are not specified by 
the model#
2. A state is characterized as either balanced or un­
balanced, The model does not allow for variance as to the 
degree of balance or imbalance#
3# The model does not give consideration to possible 
variation in the intensity of the relationship between 
cognitive elements#
4. The model conceptually is vague and loosely con­
structed. This detracts from its ability to predict# It 
has already been mentioned that several other criticisms 
can be made. Some will not be made since they are not 
relevant to this research case; other criticisms will be 
reserved and presented in a“general way after the congruity
model has been reviewed.
2 8The Congruity Model
The congruity model can be thought of as a special 
type of balance. Although it is quite similar to the basic
2®Charles e . Osgood and Percy H. Tannenbaum, "The 
Principle of Congruity in the Prediction of Attitude Change", 
Psychological Review. 62 (March 1955), pp. 42-55#
30
balance model, it deals with the specific problem of. com­
munication acceptance. In comparison to the balance model 
it has two major advantages; first, it makes explicit pre­
dictions about the direction of attitude change, and secondly, 
it predicts the extent of attitude change.
The basic assumption underlying the model is: "That
i
attitudes in a particular mind can be represented by a
vertical line from + to - with names of the objects of atti-
29tudes ranged along this line". The model also contains 
linkages between the attitude objects which are referred to 
as bonds. Bonds are of two types; associative and disso­
ciative. "Associative bonds can be verbal expressions of
30approval or solidarity and they can be actions".
In the special situation (communication acceptance), 
with which the congruity model is concerned, there is a
i f
person (P), P's attitude toward another person (S - the source),
who gives information pro or con about an object (matter) or
other person (0) about which P also holds an attitude. A
hypothetical example of the way in which the model works can
now be presented.
P likes S, P likes 0, S says something bad about
0. 0's good represents the communication by what
S says about 0. He indicates attitude change by 
the changes in P's evaluation of both S and 0 as
90
^Brown, op. cit., p. 558,
30Ibid., p. 559.
a result of this communication. A state of con­
gruity depends on how much P likes 0 and S. If 
P likes 0 just a little bit and likes S a great 
deal, then incongruity exists and produces psy­
chological pressure for P to change his attitudes 
toward both 0 and S •31.
The relationships are quantified by use of a .seven-point 
scale, which is usually referred to as the Semantic Differ­
ential. This scale, which ranges from +3 to -3 measures
/
the affective aspects of the relationships between P and 0, 
and P and S. Only the relationships are quantified, not the 
affectivity of the communication. The affective nature of 
the communication is labeled as either associative (good, 
positive) or dissociative (bad, negative).
Two major hypotheses regarding the prediction of atti­
tude change are derived from the model. First, when incon­
gruity exists, P's attitudes toward both 0 and S will change. 
Second, P's attitudes toward 0 and S will be modified in
j- . . .inverse proportion to their intensity. The more extreme an 
attitude, the less that attitude will change. Predictions
32of attitude change are derived from the following formula.
Change = 1S1 P
101+1S1
In this formula 1S1 and 1P1 equal the degree of intensity of 
P's attitude toward S and 0; and P = the pressure toward
31 . . ’Kiesler, Collins, and Miller, op. cit., p. 178.
^Ibid., p. 180.
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congruity. Pressure toward congruity can be defined as the 
total amount of change necessary for perfect congruity to 
exist.
For associative bonds, (characterized by positive 
communications) the pressure toward congruity equals the 
algebraic difference in evaluation of S and 0. For dis­
sociative bonds, (characterized by negative communications) 
the pressure toward congruity is equivalent to the amount
of change necessary for P's attitude toward the source and
)
the object to be equidistant from zero.
Early research indicated that there were two basic 
problems with the congruity model. The first of these is 
that the model implies that the amount of attitude change 
for the source of the communication and the object of the 
communication will be equal. This implication is not sup­
ported by research data. Rokead and Rothman have suggested 
that this problem can be corrected (in terms of prediction) 
when one takes account of the importance of the separate 
items (the source and the i t e m s ) T h e  second problem is: 
That with a higher level of pressure toward congruity subjects 
tend not to accept the communication assertion, but instead, 
they reject it, which is opposite of what the model predicts. 
This has been referred to as the correction for incredulity.
^Milton Rokead and Gilbert Rothman, "The Principle of
Belief Congruence and the Congruity Principle as Models of 
Cognitive Interactions", Psychological Review. 72 (March 1965), 
p. 141. •
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Using corrections for incredulity, the predictive power of 
the model is greatly increased.
Kerrick, exposing subjects to photographs and captions
separately and then together, found that two things rated
"good" alone, were rated better in combination than either 
34of them alone. The congruity model predicts that the rating 
of the combination would always be somewhere between the two 
individual ratings. Other research has supported this same 
finding.
Some basic criticisms of the congruity model ares
1. The model is of narrow scope in that it is limited 
to the communication.
2. Much of the quantitative detail of the model1 is 
unsupported by research data.
3. The correction for incredulity may, by elimination, 
pass over important aspects of attitudinal processes.
4. The model fails to consider the strength or in­
tensity of the associative or dissociative bonds between 
cognitive elements.
So far, two models based on the consistency principle
34Discussed in Charles E. Osgood, "Cognitive Dynamics 
in the Conduct of Human Affairs", Public Opinion Quarterly.
24 (Summer 1960), pp. 349-352.
35Seymour Fisbein and Ardiel Hunter, "Summation Versus 
Balance in Attitude Organization and Change", Journal of 
Abnormal and Social Psychology. 56 (March 1958), pp. 230-238.
T :
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have been briefly received. In reviewing the basic balance 
model much more could have been said about additional devel­
opments and additions to it. Also, there is much more to be 
said about the congruity model. But the purpose in review­
ing these typ models is to first, use them as examples of 
models based on a notion consistency, which makes predictions 
about attitude organization and change. The second purpose 
has been to search for a model or theory that is capable of 
explicitly dealing with both attitude and behavioral change. 
So far this the crux of the research problem.
The question should certainly be raised as to where
does behavior "fit*' into these two models. Perhaps the
answer is that behavioral change is only implied since the
two models were not designed to deal with it. Both of these
models are intra-personals "They pertain to the relations of
the three attitudes' components within an individual and
specify various conditions that control these relations and
. 3 6
produce changes m  them*'. It has been noted that one com­
ponent of an attitude is behavioral, i.e., a predisposition 
to act. It follows from this that a change in the behavioral 
component (predisposition to act) will bring about a be­
havioral change if behaviors and attitudes are consistent.
If the components of an attitude are consistent with one
36secord and Backman, op. cit., p. 109,
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another a change in either the cognitive or affective com­
ponent could produce an inconsistency which could be resolved 
by a change in the behavioral component. Neither of these 
two theories allows one to make very accurate predictions 
about the part that behavior plays in attitude change and 
vice versa*
To repeat once again: The basic research problem is
to study the relationship between attitude change and be­
havioral change as it is brought about through resettlement 
due to the construction of major reservoirs* The search is 
for a theory which will be useful in making explicit pre­
dictions about attitude change as it is related to overt 
behavior. The balance model and the congruity model are 
being "rejected" because of their limited applicability to 
the research problem. Instead, it appears that the third, 
and yet to be discussed, consistency model1 has the greatest 
utility in this research situation* This model, which has 
"••. the greatest merit of linking attitude to overt
37behavior", is Leon Festinger*s theory of cognitive dissonance.
38Dissonance Theory
In reviewing balance and congruity, the term "model*1
37Ibid., p. 115,
38LeOn Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957).
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was used. As dissonance is dealt with, the term theory will 
be used. This is in accord with Roger Brown’s usage of the 
terms model and theory. He suggests that balance and con­
gruity are models since they are simulations of attitude 
Change. In speaking of dissonance Brown says;
The third formulation is too loose to be con­
sidered a model or simulation of attitude change.
We will call it a theory. The dissonance theory, 
even though the principles involved do not stand 
in the kind of deductive relation that the word 
theory implies. Dissonance theory is actually a 
collection of loosely-related i d e a s . 39
Dissonance theory begins with a basic consistency assumption,
••.the individual strives toward consistency 
within himself...his opinions and attitudes 
exist on clusters that are internally consis­
tent... there is the same kind of consistency 
between what a person knows or berieves and 
what he does • 4TT~
For dissonance thoery, consistency is the norm. When 
inconsistency arises, (it is hypothesized that) a discomfort 
exists which acts as a motivating force for change. Festinger 
substitutes the terms consonance for consistency and dis­
sonance for inconsistency.
Two basic propositions form the core of the theory.
These are:
1. The existence of dissonance, being psychologically
3%rown, op* cit,,. p, 550.
40 .Festinger, op. cit., p. 1.
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uncomfortable, will motivate the person to try and to reduce 
the dissonance and achieve consonance.4-*-
2, When dissonance is present, in addition to trying
to reduce it, the person will actively avoid situations and 
information which would likely increase the dissonance.4  ^
Dissonance is defined as the existence of nonfitting relations 
among cognitions. A cognition is "any knowledge, opinion, or
belief about the environment, about oneself, or about one's
43 . . .behavior". Both the conditions of dissonance and consonance
refer to relations between pairs of cognitions. The content
of a cognition is determined by reality which may be social,
psychological, or physical. One's cognitions map or reflect
one's reality.
...in other words, elements of cognition correspond 
for the most part with what the person actually does 
or feels or with what actually exists in the environ­
ment. In the case of opinions, beliefs, and values, 
the reality may be what others think or do; in other 
instances the reality may be what encountered ex­
perimentally or what others have told him.44
Situations may arise where cognitions deviate from reality.
In such a situation the reality which impinges will exert 
pressures in the direction of bringing the appropriate cog­
nitive elements into correspondence.
4^Ibid., p. 3.
4^Festinger loc. cit. 
^Festinger, op. cit., p. 9. 
44Ibid., p. 10.
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There are three types of relations which can exist 
between pairs of cognitive elements. The first of these is 
the irrelevant relation. Within a person's cognitive mileu 
there are bound to be a number of cognitions which are un­
related and irrelevant to one another# For example, valuing 
farming as the "good life" and enjoying football are two 
different cognitions which are not relevant to each other#
The second type of relation between cognitive elements is the 
consonant relation, which is a relevant relation. Two cog­
nitions are in consonance if one cognition follows from the 
other cognition. Holding the value of farming as the "good 
life" and being engaged in farming are two relevant cognitions 
which are consonant with one another. If a person believes 
that farming is the best or "good" way of life it is quite 
likely that the same person will be engaged in farming. The 
third relation is the dissonant relation# A dissonant re­
lation exists where two cognitions are relevant but do not 
fit together. Festinger, in attempting formal conceptual 
definition, states that: "Two elements are in a dissonant
relation if, considering these two alone the obverse of one 
element would follow from the other.•.x and y are dissonant 
if not-x follows from y."4  ^ To revert to the farming ex­
ample; if a person values farming as the "good life" and 
lives and works in the city, it is quite likely that a
45Ibid., p. 13
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dissonance exists. There are a number of reasons why rele­
vant cognitions can be dissonant. A pair of cognitions 
could be logically inconsistent or contradictory. Cultural
elements or group norms may define dissonance. Past experi-
> -
ence can also contribute to the establishment of ;a dissonant 
relation. Given that these are the major bases for the 
arousal of dissonance, the question to be answered iss In 
what situations does dissonance arise?
Due to the nature of the definition of dissonance, it 
is almt>st impossible to enumerate and elaborate upon all 
possible dissonance situations. Dissonance, by definition, 
is a common, everyday occurence which varies in strength and 
duration. To^repeat: It occurs when people find themselves
t
doing things which arecon t £ ar y to what they believe, or when
they find themselves holding attitudes or beliefs which are
contrary to other attitudes and beliefs which they possess.
There are two common situations; where such contradictions
arise. The first of these is the situation where a person
receives new "knowledge** or cognitions which "do not fit"
with existing ’^knowledges" or cognitions. As originally
stated by Festinger:
New events may happen or new information may be­
come known to a person, creating at least a 
momentary dissonance with existing knowledge, 
opinion, or cognition concerning behavior. Since
40
a person does not have complete and perfect con­
trol over the information that reaches him and 
over events that can happen in his environment,
such dissonances may easily arise.^6
An example may be useful in clarifying this type of dissonance 
situation. Take the case of a farmer or small town dweller 
who holds that his way of life and his farm or community is
the best. He receives new knowledge in the form of a rumor
(which is later confirmed) that his farm or community will 
be inundated as the result of a reservoir which will be built. 
According to dissonance theory, the cognition of having one's 
farm or community inundated does "not follow from" the cog­
nition of believing that one's present way of life and farm 
or community is the best.
The second common dissonance situation “takes place-in 
a setting where there is an absence of new knowledge or 
cognitions. This situation is mos t ~ c 1ose-ly related to de­
cision making. Festinger maintains that! "Where an opinion 
must be formed or a decision taken, some dissonance is almost 
unavoidably created between the cognition of the action taken 
and those opinions or knowledges which tend to point to a 
different a c t i o n . & thesis-related example of this type 
of dissonance situation would be the case of a farmer who is 
forced to make a migration decision as a result of a reservoir
46Festinger, op. cit., p.. 4.
47Ibid., p. 5.
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project. Perhaps this individual must decide whether to move 
to a new farm or to retire and move to a small community or 
city. The action he finally takes is to move to the city, 
in spite of the fact that his value system is oriented 
toward agrarianism. Dissonance would be present because 
the cognition of having moved to the city "does not follow 
from** other residual cognitions which consist of agrarian 
values•
"All dissonant relations, of course, are not of equal 
magnitude."40 Dissonance theory recognizes that cognitive 
inconsistency can vary depending on the nature of the cog­
nitions involved, and it follows that the pressure to remove 
inconsistency can vary in terms of intensity. If the theory 
is to have predictive power it must be able to deal with the 
variations in the intensity or magnitude of dissonance. Two 
theoretical propositions have been provided to resolve this 
problem.
1. If two elements are dissonant with one another, the 
magnitude of dissonance will be a function of the importance 
of the elements.4^
i
E Pli
D = EKPli - i-1 = Ti
EKP2j j Tj
E P2 j
j=l
4®Ibid., p. 16.
49Festmger, op. cit., p. 17.
42
Wheres D = magnitude of dissonance
Pli = the importance of element i in Cluster 1 
P2j = the importance of element j in Cluster 2 
K = a constant 
and Where: Ti ^  Tj50
2, Assuming that all the elements relevant to the one in 
question are equally important, the total amount of dissonance 
between this element and the remainder of the person’s cog­
nition will depend on the portion of relevant elements that 
are dissonant with the one in question
Dissonance = No. of dissonant elements 
No. of consonant elements
The importance of these two propositions is that they provide
direction in predicting that change will occur because:
The presence of dissonance gives rise to pressures 
to reduce or eliminate the dissonance. The strength 
of the pressures to reduce the dissonance is a func­
tion of the magnitude of the dissonance
It has already been pointed out that dissonance, in itself, 
is a motivating force that leads to change. The change that 
takes place occurs in that direction which will result in 
having relevant pairs of cognitions in a relation in which 
one cognition follows from the other. This dissonance re­
duction results then in a state of consonance. More
50Kiesler, Collins, and Miller, op. cit., p. 195.
51Ibid.
r^Ibid., p. 18.
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specifically, there are three major modes of dissonance re­
duction. The first mode of dissonance reduction is changing 
a behavioral cognitive element. Essentially, this involves 
changing one's behavior, denying one's behavior, or percep­
tually distorting one's behavior. The end result of this type 
of dissonance reduction is a situation where a behavior 
corresponds to the other elements of the person's cognitions. 
Take the case of a tenant farmer who must resettle as a re­
sult of reservoir construction but, because of lack of capital 
and greater competition for farmland (due to a shortage created 
by reservoir construction), is forced to migrate to a nonfarm 
situation. This same individual, whose values are basically 
agrarian, believes that farming is the best form of work and 
the best way of life, but realizes that he will no longer be 
able to farm “on his own". A dissonant relationship exists 
between cognitions which consist of agrarian values and the 
realization that he will no longer have his own farm. One 
possible way of reducing this dissonance would be to change 
occupational behavior from that of being an independent 
farmer to working in a farm-related business such as a co-op 
(this alternative being in contrast to another type of 
occupational behavior; such as working as a retail clerk).
The second mode of dissonance reduction is changing 
an environmental cognitive element. This mode involves 
changing the environment in some way. Changes may occur in
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in the psychological or physical environment* An example 
would be the farmer who farms 400 acres but loses it all to 
a reservoir* He receives money enough to purchase only 250 
new acres. This farmer could reduce dissonance by asserting 
that his 250 new acres have a much better quality of soil*
This would be dissonance reduction through changing one’s 
psychological reality.
The third mode of dissonance reduction is through the 
addition of new cognitive elements. New elements are added 
to either cognition or to both. This mode does not completely 
eliminate dissonance, it only reduces it to a level that can 
be tolerated by the individual. The magnitude of dissonance 
is reduced because the addition of new cognitive elements 
changes the proportion of relevant elements that are disso­
nant with a given cognition. As it has been stated; "The 
total amount of dissonance between a given element and the 
remainder of the person's cognition will depend on the pro­
portion of relevant elements that are dissonant with the one 
53m  question." To use a resettlement example, one can take 
again the case of the farmer who loses a large farm to a 
reservoir but is only able to purchase a relatively small 
farm. To reduce the magnitude of the dissonance that exists 
in this situation, this same farmer may actively seek new 
information about the small farm, which, in effect, is the
^^Ibid., p. 27
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addition of consonant elements. New neighbors may tell him 
how productive the farm is per acre, or how easy it is to 
farm because of the terrain# With the addition of these 
new consonant elements, the proportion of consonant-to- 
dissonant elements increases and dissonance is reduced.
Common to all three modes of dissonance reduction is 
the changing of one or more cognitive elements. Some cog­
nitive elements lend themselves to change more readily than 
do others# Being able to control for the variations in re­
sistance to the changing of cognitive elements is necessary 
if predictive power is to be maintained# Festinger and 
other dissonance theorists have dealt with two types of 
resistance to change# The first type that is given consider­
ation is the resistance to change of behavioral cognitive 
elements# Under this type of resistance there are three 
circumstances that make it difficult for a person to change 
his behavior# First, changing one's behavior may be a pain­
ful experience. A migration move which results in a 
financial loss is an example of this type of "'painful 
experience"# Second, an individual's present behavior may 
be satisfying. A person who is faced with forced resettle­
ment in the future, and at present is doing poorly at 
farming, may still resist migration since he is pleased with 
his neighbors and local friends# His present pattern of 
social participation is satisfying behavior# Third, making
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a behavioral change, may be impossible. For the elderly
farmer, farming may be the only way of life he knows. An
occupational change may be impossible. All three resistances
to change (reduction of dissonance) are characterized by the
fact that "the first and foremost source of resistance to
change for any cognitive element is the responsiveness of
54such elements to reality"•
The second type of resistance to change involves the
changing of environmental cognitive elements. These too are
characterized by the source of resistance being determined by
the responsiveness of the cognitive element to reality. "When
there is a clear and equivocal reality corresponding to some
cognitive element, the possibilities of change are almost 
55nil." A more important source of resistance to the chang­
ing of an environmental cognition has been presented by 
Festinger. In speaking of this he says:
This source of resistance to change lies in the 
fact that an element is in relationship with a 
large number of other elements and to the extent 
that changing it would replace these consonances 
by dissonances, the elements will be resistant
to change.56
Resistance to dissonance reduction is an important 
consideration when making predictions that are based upon 
dissonance theory. It is just as important to recognize
54Festinger, op. cit., p. 24.
^Ibid.
JUFestmger, op. cit., p. 31.
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that there are circumstances -when the fear of dissonance is 
so strong that people actively avoid an increase in dissonance.
This then is the core of the theory of cognitive 
dissonance. Additional propositions and the body of research 
that this theory has generated have been applied to four 
situations. These situations are; (1) decision making;
(2) forced compliance; (3) voluntary and involuntary exposure 
to information; and (4) social support. Only two of these 
dissonance situations are of direct relevance to the research 
problem; these are the decision-making and the forced-compliance 
situations. Before dealing with these situational aspects 
of the theory, a summary of the basic theoretical proposi­
tions is in order. Festinger summarizes them as follows;
1. There may exist dissonant or nonfitting 
relations among cognitive elements.
2. The existence of dissonance gives rise 
to pressures to reduce the dissonance and to 
avoid increases in dissonance.
3. Manifestations of the operation of these 
pressures include behavior changes, changes of 
cognition, and circumspect exposure to new in­
formation and new opinions.57
The Decision-Making Situation
The theory of cognitive dissonance is relevant in that
situation where the individual chooses among two or more
alternatives and in doing so rejects the remaining alternatives.
5^Festinger, op. cit., p. 31.
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Merely preferring one alternative over another does not pro­
duce dissonance, nor is dissonance in the decision-making 
situation the same as pre-decisional conflict.
The person is in a conflict situation before 
making the decision. After having made the 
decision he is no longer in conflict; he has 
made his choice; he has, so to speak, resolved 
the conflict. He is no longer being pushed in 
two or more directions simultaneously. He is 
now committed to the chosen course of action. *
It is here that dissonance exists, and the 
pressure to reduce this dissonance is not pushing 
the person in two directions simultaneously•58
Four variables affect post-decisional dissonances
1. The more important the decision the greater the 
dissonance.
2. The less attractive the chosen alternative the 
greater the dissonance.
3. The more attractive the unchosen alternative the 
greater the dissonance.
4. The greater the similarity between alternatives 
the less the dissonance.
Brehm made one of the first tests of dissonance predictions
59*as they are related to decision making. Each subject in 
the laboratory setting rated a series of objects. The ex­
perimenter then offered the subject her choice of one or two 
objects. The subjects then rated the objects. A
^®Ibid., p. 39.
C Q  , .
J Jack W. Brehm, "Post-Decision Changes m  the Desir 
ability of Alternatives*', Journal of Abnormal and Social 
Psychology, 52 (May 1956), pp. 384-389.
49
high-dissonance condition was created by having subjects 
choose from two objects which were similar in attractiveness. 
In the low-dissonance condition the two objects were very 
dissimilar in attractiveness. The prediction was made that 
the subjects in the high-dissonance condition would show the 
greatest evidence of dissonance reduction. They would ex- 
agerate the attractiveness of the chosen alternative' and 
underestimate the attractiveness of the unchosen alternative 
to a greater extent than the subjects in the low-dissonance 
condition. In general, the prediction was confirmed,
Cohen, in trying to demonstrate that the same findings 
had application in a natural setting, administered a 
questionnaire to 30 college students who were considering 
becoming engaged over Christmas vacation. Before vacation 
started the students were asked questions dealing with the 
negative and positive aspects of engagement. Also, an attempt 
was made at measuring the degree of affect, toward the pro­
spective mate. If a student perceived more negative aspects 
to engagement than positive aspects, the more dissonance 
that student would feel if he became engaged. The experi^ 
menters felt that the easiest cognitive element to change in 
the engagement setting would be the degree of affect toward.
Discussed in Jack W. Brehm and Arthur R. Cohen, 
Explorations in Cognitive Dissonance, (New: York: John Wiley
and Sons, Inc., 1962), pp. 78-81.
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the fiance. The main hypothesis was that the greater the 
number of negative aspects perceived by the student before 
engagement, the more he would increase positive affect toward 
his fiance. Students who actually became engaged were then 
divided into high- and low-dissonance groups depending on 
the number of negative aspects they perceived before engage­
ment. The hypothesis was supported, with the high-dissonance 
groups showing a marked increase in the degree of positive 
affect. A host of other researchers has provided similar 
evidence which substantiates the dissonance hypotheses in the 
decision-making situation.^1 Although much of the evidence 
is open to criticism, the criticism revolves around methodo­
logical concerns more frequently than around theoretical 
concerns. General criticisms will be commented on later.
The Forced-Compliance Situation
The forced compliance situation is where a person is 
induced to behave in a manner contrary to his own personal 
attitudes or beliefs. "There are circumstances in which 
persons will behave in a manner counter to their convictions 
or will publicly make statements which they do not really 
b e l i e v e . i n this case the dissonance exists because the 
relevant behavioral and attitudinal cognitions do not follow
^1Brehm and Cohen in Explorations in Cognitive 
Dissonance cite supporting evidence from forty research cases.
62pestinger, op. cit., p. 84.
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from one another. For this type of dissonance to occur, an 
agent which can influence, pressure, or induce the person 
holding the cognitions of concern must be present. Public 
compliance comes about in two ways.
First, a person is forced to comply to a situation 
through the use of the threat of punishment. "If the 
threatened punishment is stronger than whatever resistance 
he has to showing compliance, he will overtly change his 
behavior or statements• por example, a farmer who opposes 
a reservoir, but is forced off his land through eminent 
domain, can change his behavior without changing his atti­
tude toward the reservoir.
The second way in which compliance is forced is through 
the use of rewards. Given a certain degree of resistance to 
change some cognition, the attractiveness of a reward may 
be great enough to overcome the resistance. If the reward 
is accepted and compliance follows, dissonance will follow. 
Accepting the reward and compliance are overt behavior, but 
private attitudes remain the same. Since there exists a 
discrepancy between private attitude and overt behavior, 
dissonance will ensue. Using the example of the farmer once 
again; the farmer who opposes reservoir construction, and is 
living on poor farmland, may perceive a good offer for his 
land as an inducement tQ resettle somewfiere else. Behavior
63Ibid., p. 85.
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changes; tout private attitudes may remain the same*
In determining the magnitude of dissonance in the 
forced-compliance situation, it is important to determine 
the number and importance of cognitive elements that are 
dissonant with the cognition of one's overt behavior. If 
this is done, something about the proportion of dissonant 
elements in the relationship will then be known. Obviously, 
this is no simple task; but dissonance theorists have pro­
vided some guidelines which are useful in serving this pur­
pose, The specification of dissonance will be dealt with 
when the hypotheses of this research are presented. However, 
it should be made clear at this point that in the forced- 
compliance situation the intensity of one's attitude will 
contribute to the magnitude of dissonance. If one is to 
specify dissonance and its magnitude, some measure of atti- 
tudinal intensity and importance is necessary. In the case
A
of being opposed to a reservoir project, there appear to be 
differing degrees to which the local people are opposed. If 
resettlement is viewed as a forced-compliance situation, it 
is just as important to determine the intensity of opposition 
as well as resulting overt behavior. As in all dissonant 
situations, the greater the amounts of dissonance the 
greater the pressure to reduce the dissonance. If the in­
ducement (reward of threat) to comply is too strong, little 
dissonance will toe created, and a minimal amount of attitude
r
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change will occur. If one desires both compliance behavior 
and attitudes "the best way would be to offer just enough 
reward or punishment to elicit the overt compliance"s This 
because any new cognitive elements consonant with the be-
CL A
havior will lessen the dissonance.
Two possibilities exist for dissonance reduction in the 
forced-compliance situation. Recalling that forced-compliance 
dissonance is basically that situation where one is induced 
to behave in a manner that is contrary to his beliefs and 
attitudes, one mode of dissonance reduction is changing one’s 
attitudes and beliefs so that they are consonant with one’s 
overt behavior. The farmer who resettles in the city can 
reduce dissonance by changing his attitudes toward the reser­
voir project; or, using the second mode of dissonance
reduction, he can "magnify the reward or punishment to in-
65crease the consonance with the overt complaint behavior".
/
More specifically, the farmer who resettles in the city may 
magnify those things that he perceives as rewarding in his 
new surroundings. He may emphasize the attributes of his 
new job or home for example. Festinger summarizes the 
forced-compliance dissonance situation in the following way.
6^Ibid., p. 95.
^Festinger, op. cit., p. 97.-
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••• public compliance without accompanying 
change in private opinion occurs when a reward 
is offered for compliance or when some punish­
ment is threatened for failure to comply. The 
dissonance thus established, the magnitude of 
which,will be a function of the importance of 
the opinions involved and of the magnitude of 
the punishment or reward, may be reduced in 
either of two ways:
1* Subsequent change of private opinion to 
make it consonant with the overt behavior.
2. Magnification of the reward or punishment 
to increase the consonance with the overt com­
pliant behavior.66
The Research
Festinger and Carlsmith tested the following two
6 Vdissonance hypotheses in a forced-compliance situation.
1. If a person is induced to say or do something oppo­
site to his private attitude, he will tend to modify his 
attitude so as to make it consonant with the cognition of 
what he has said or done.
2. The greater the pressure used to elicit behavior 
contrary to one's private attitude (beyond the minimum needed 
to elicit it), the less his attitude will change. Subjects 
who had completed "boring" experimental tasks were told that 
student helpers usually brought the next subject in and told 
them how enjoyable the experiment would be, but on this 
particular day the student helper was not present. The
°Festinger, loc. cit.
* . . .D/Leon Festinger and J. M. Carlsmith, "Cognitive
Consequences of Forced Compliance", Journal of Abnormal and 
Social Psychology. 68 (April 1964), pp. 359-366.
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experimenter then offered the subject a monetary reward if 
he would take the helper's place. One group of subjects 
was offered $1.00 and the other group of students was offered 
$20,00. The subjects privately felt that the task was dull 
and boring; but, for a reward, agreed to tell others that it 
was interesting. After they had served as helpers, the 
subjects were interviewed, and they rated their opinion of 
the experiment on an 11-point scale. As Festinger and 
Carlsmith had predicted, those subjects who received the 
$1.00 rated the experiment higher in terms of enjoyment than 
the students who received the $20.00 reward. According to 
Secord and Backman, "The key to understanding the second 
hypothesis is the point that dissonance is at its maximum 
when the opposing cognitive elements are equal in strength 
and importance.
69Brehm and Crocker report similar findings. Hungry
subjects were asked to undergo additional food deprivation.
One group of subjects received no monetary reward, but another
group of subjects received $5.00. As was predicted, the
group who received no money reported that they were less
hungry and actually ate less than the subjects who received
70the monetary reward. Cohen, using four different levels
6 ftSecord and Backman, op. cit,, p, 118.
^Jack C. Crocker, "An Experiment on Hunger", in 
Jack W. Brehm and Arthur R. Cohen, Explorations in Cognitive 
Dissonance, (New Yorks John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1962), 
pp. 133-136*.
70Brown, op. cit., p. 595.
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of monetary reward, found that with the lower level of reward 
used as an incentive— the greater the amount of attitude 
change, A great deal of other research evidence exists in 
support of these two ”forced-compliance” hypotheses.
An additional hypothesis has been derived from the 
forced-compliance situation and has been tested. This hy­
pothesis is: The greater the negative behavior a person
performs, the greater the attitude change toward consonance 
with the act. This hypothesis has also received substantial 
support from a variety of research cases.
The attempt has been to provide a review of the theory 
of cognitive dissonance. Special emphasis has been placed 
on two types of situational dissonance, decision making and 
forced compliance. These two situations have special rele­
vance for the study of resettlement and attitude change, 
since certain aspects of resettlement involve both of these.
i' I
As the theory has been reviewed, little negative criticism
has been presented. Before resettlement is analyzed in terms
of dissonance theory, a review of the criticism (both positive
♦
and negative) is in order.
Major Criticism of the Theory of Cognitive Dissonance
Prior to beginning this review of three major theories 
of attitude change, it was stated that the basic topic under 
study was the relationship between attitude change and be­
havioral change. A search was then made for a theory which
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had the potential of dealing adequately with both. The 
balance and congruence models were rejected because of 
limited ability to do this. These two models fail to deal 
directly with behavior since their main emphasis is on 
consistency between attitudes and within attitudes. It is 
important to recognize that while there are many similar­
ities between dissonance theory, and the other two models, 
there are also genuine differences.
Dissonance theory maintains that any pair of cognitive 
elements must be relevant to one another before there can be 
a dissonant relationship. This has been labeled conceptually 
as psychological implication. The balance model possesses 
no equivalent concept, and for this reason the states of 
unbalance and dissonance are not the same. "I own a farm", 
"My wife is a hard worker", but'My wife does not own a farm", 
are three cognitions which exist in a state of unbalance, as
defined by the basic balance model. For dissonance theory,
no dissonance exists between these three cognitions since
the first cognitions are not relevant to the third. The
point is that although dissonance is a consistency theory, 
it does not define inconsistency identically to other con­
sistency theories.
Another important difference is that dissonance theory 
can de^ J. with.varying magnitudes of dissonance and specifies 
theoretically the basis for such variations. The basic,
balance model fails to account for variations in magnitude. 
Modifications of the basic, balance model, while specifying 
variation, defines it differently.
The reduction of dissonance and the reduction of un­
balance may occur in different ways. Unbalance and incongru­
ence are resolved through changing a relationship or affective 
evaluation. In addition to this, dissonance theory deals 
with such modes as: Adding new cognitive elements, mini­
mizing the importance of dissonance elements, and magnifying 
rewards.
These then are some of the basic differences between 
dissonance theory and the other models of attitude change. 
Because of these differences, the models work in different 
ways and have different limitations as to what types of 
phenomena they can be concerned with.
In criticizing the theory of cognitive dissonance, the 
appropriate place to begin is to criticize it as theory. As 
a theory in any ideal axiomatic sense, cognitive dissonance 
obviously falls short. The main reason for this is that the 
propositions involved are not deductively related. This 
appears to be a consequence of the loose logical structure 
of dissonance theory which in turn is a result of the concept­
ualization that is involved. The concept of cognitive element 
is defined by other obscure terms such as knowledge, belief, 
and opinion about one's feelings, one's self, one's behavior,
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and one's environment# The theory also makes use of the
concept of implications# Brown asks the question, "What does
it mean to say that one element (a) implies the negation of
71another element (b)?" The concept of implication carries 
a connotation of logic, but Festinger maintains that not all 
dissonant relations are derived from logical contradiction# 
Other dissonance theorists have clarified this matter by 
pointing out that dissonance is not a matter of logical im­
plication but rather a result of psychological expectation#
Brehm and Cohen maintain that it's a question of "what else
72a person expects when he holds a given cognition"• The 
concept of magnitude of dissonance, and the propositions 
built upon, offer little direction in measuring the concept# 
The problems of conceptual clarity and definitions lead 
to a variety of additional problems that range from theoret­
ical problems to problems of measurement. One of these 
problems is measuring the degree of dissonance which exists. 
In past experimentation, the degree of dissonance has been 
represented ordinally. The existence of dissonance has been 
amply demonstrated under laboratory conditions# Out of the 
laboratory and in a non-experimental setting it is probable 
that dissonance rarely exists in such large amounts# Smaller 
amounts of dissonance require more precise measurements, and
7lBrown, op. cit#, p# 595#
^^Brehm and Cohen, op# cit#, p# 3#
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if ordinal measurements are used, they must have the capa­
bility of making finer distinctions.
Although dissonance theory suggests three different 
ways in which dissonance may be reduced, it does not specify 
which mode of reduction will be used, given a. certain set of 
conditions. In the experimentation that has been generated 
by the theory, only one mode of reduction is possible since 
the experimenters close off alternative modes. For dissonance 
theory to have external validity, we need to know what modes 
of dissonance reduction are normative in particular situations. 
We need to make theoretical applications in natural settings.
The precision of the predictions made by the theory is 
limited by the problem of resistance to change. Precision 
would be enhanced if measures of resistance were established.
In a given set of cognitions resistance to change may vary 
from one cognition to another. In predicting which cognitive
A
element will change, it is helpful to know the relative 
strength of resistance to change of all the relevant cognitions.
Another measurement problem exists in regard to the 
importance of cognitions and cognitive elements. How can 
importance be measured? The theory provides little direction 
in acheiving precise measurements of importance. At present, 
importance can be determined only through logical argument 
and ordinal specifications.
Individual differences in the ability to tolerate
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dissonance and in patterns of dissonance reduction are two
more questions that go unanswered. These two considerations
are very relevant for making predictions, and research is
lacking in this area. Until these two questions are answered,
no predictions for individual subjects can be made. Dissonance
theory, at present, is limited to making predictions about
classes and categories of subjects.
Critics have taken issue with Festinger*s use of the
term "obverse". Festinger stated: "Two cognitions are in a
dissonant relationship when one implies the obverse of the 
73other," Brehm and Cohen feel that the use of obverse m
this statement places too many limitations on the theory.
Instead, they suggest that the phrase "in the direction of
74being obverse" be substituted for the word "obverse". This
substitution gives the theory greatep scope, and it makes the
determination of dissonant relationship somewhat easier.
Perhaps the most extreme criticism that has been leveled
at the theory of cognitive dissonance takes the form of asking
75if dissonance theory can be disproven. Some have maintained 
that dissonance theory, as a result of its vagueness, has the 
ability to explain everything, which in turn leads nowhere.
73Festinger, op. cit., p. 13.
^^Brehm and Cohen,- op. cit., pp. 3-11.
^Kiesler, Collins, and Miller, op. cit., p. 36.
62
In some cases, the students of cognitive dissonance have 
been too hasty in their rush to experimentation and over­
looked Festinger's own directives for testing the theory.
But perhaps the best way of avoiding the loose 
usage of the concept of dissonance is to emphasize 
its clarity rather than its vagueness. Dissonance 
is not anything which exists by itself. It is a 
characterization of a relationship between cognitive 
elements. Thus, determining whether or not disso­
nance exists, should take the form of first 
specifying the cognitive elements, or clusters, 
which are under consideration and then examining 
whether, considering one alone, the obverse of 
the other follows. If it seems plausible to 
assert that the relation is dissonant, it is 
usually also helpful to specify on what grounds—  
logical, experimental, cultural or otherwise— the 
"follows from" holds in that instance. It is also 
clearly necessary to be able to specify what specific 
changes in cognition, or what new cognitive elements,: 
would reduce the magnitude of the dissonance thus 
determined•76
Obviously, the theory of cognitive dissonance has its 
weak points and problems. In this respect, it is not unlike 
most theories in social science. At the same time, the 
theory does have positive features. First, the theory has 
produced a vast amount of data; it has been fruitful because 
of the amount of empirical research that is has generated. 
Second, it has led to unusual predictions which have been 
substantiated by research. In comparison to other theories, 
based on the consistency of principle, cognitive dissonance 
is a powerful theory because of its ability to make such 
predictions. Third, the theory of cognitive dissonance has 
been a productive tool in that the research it has generated
^Festinger, op. cit., p. 279.
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has added substantially to the growing body of knowledge 
about attitude and cognitive change,
A positive attribute of the theory that is especially 
pertinent to the research at hand is the theory's ability to 
deal with behavioral change as it is related to attitude 
change. The theory explicitly considers the knowledge of 
behavior as a cognitive element and suggests that behavioral 
change and attitude change are inter-related phenomena. 
Behavior can change in the direction of being consonant with 
one's attitudes; or attitudes can change in the direction of 
being consonant with one's b e h a v i o r I t  is for this reason 
that the theory of cognitive dissonance should prove to be a 
useful tool in studying the relationship between attitude 
change and forced resettlement.
Placing forced resettlement in the theoretical frame­
work of cognitive dissonance requires specifying the relevant 
cognitions involved in resettlement and their importance, 
determining if dissonance exists and for whom, and specifying 
which modes of dissonance reduction are feasible in the 
resettlement situation. This should result in arriving at 
testable hypotheses which will permit investigating the 
following questions.
1. Do the attitudes of local opponents to Corps 
reservoirs change over time froirif.a negative position to a 
positive position?
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2. Is there any variation as to who changes and how 
much they change, i.e., does the generalization hold?
3. What specifically are the bases for variation of 
attitude change and the intensity with which an attitude is 
held? These three questions, which are of practical interest, 
lead to the following theory-related activities.
1. A test of the predictive power of the theory of 
cognitive dissonance in a "natural'* (non-experimental) 
setting.
2. A study of the problem of relating attitude change 
to behavior change.
1
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Chapter 3
COGNITIVE DISSONANCE AND FORCED RESETTLEMENT
The Resettlement Process
When reservoirs are constructed, resettlement comes 
about as a result of the acquisition of land. Some land is 
permanently inundated by the reservoir; other acquired lands 
are inundated only periodically, in times of high water. 
Obviously, acquired lands must be abandoned as a safety pro­
cedure. Acquired agricultural lands that are inundated only 
periodically are most often leased back to someone engaged 
in farming. A reservoir may require that some give up all 
their land and others only part. It may also require partial 
or complete inundation of small towns, rural schools, and 
cemeteries.
Once Congress authorizes and appropriates funds for a 
reservoir project, land acquisition begins. The land can be 
acquired either through negotiation or condemnation. Federal 
and private appraisers evaluate the worth of each tract that 
will be acquired. Once a "fair price" is determined, govern­
ment negotiators make the owner an offer. This first offer 
is not inflexible, and other offers can be made as negotia­
tions proceed. If agreement through negotiation cannot be 
reached, the power of eminent domain is utilized-and
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condemnation proceedings take place in a division of the 
Federal District Court. Once the local landowner's lands 
have been acquired, he is faced with making a migration 
decision. The acquisition of lands also affects renters or 
tenants who farm or dwell on land that is acquired. The 
tenant must also make a migration decision.
Resettlement as a technical real estate term refers to 
the movement of persons and possessions from a federally- 
acquired tract of land to a new tract which has been acquired 
by the individual. In general, the cost of searching for a 
new home and the cost of moving are reimbursable. Since the 
local owners and tenants are forced to move by project con­
struction and Federal land acquisition, it may be more accurate 
to consider the resettlement and migration that takes place 
as forced resettlement and forced migration. This is in 
contrast to resettlement and migration decisions that are 
arrived at independently by the individual.
Forced Resettlement as a Dissonant Decision-Making Situation 
Once the local residents realize that their land will 
be acquired for a reservoir project and that they must re-
77settle, a major decision must be made about where to resettle.
77The nature of the decision-making process and the 
considerations that are made are not of interest in this 
research case. The task is to ascertain whether or not 
dissonance exists as a consequence of the resettlement 
decision.
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When a decision is made and the actual migration takes place, 
behavioral change is inevitable. It has already been pointed 
out that patterns of social interaction and participation, 
and occupational behavior will change. The more extreme the 
migration decision, the greater amount of behavioral change.
The farmer who must make a migration decision will probably 
have at least three alternatives to select from. These alter­
natives ares (1) move to another farm; (2) move to a small 
rural town; and (3) move to an urban area. Each alternative 
involves a different amount of behavioral change— the first 
alternative, the smallest amount and the third alternative— the 
largest amount•
Figure 5
Forced Resettlement Alternatives 
(Farm Origin)
Behavioral Change Migration Destination
High Urban
Origin = Farm
Rural Nonfarm
Low Rural Farm
Those persons who were living in a rural town and who 
are forced to resettle will also have alternatives available
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in arriving at a decision. It is probable that they have only 
two available alternatives; (l) moving to another small town 
or (2) moving to an urban setting. Again, the first alter­
native would require less behavior change than the second 
alternative.
Figure 6
Forced Resettlement Alternatives 
(Rural Nonfarm Origin)
1
Behavioral Change Migration Desintation
High Urban
Origin = Rural Nonfarm
Low Rural Nonfarm
Given that there are feasible resettlement alternatives in the 
migration decision, one alternative is acted upon and the others 
are rejected. When the migration decision is made, dissonance 
occurs. Surrounding each alternative is a cluster of conso­
nant elements. One may perceive both positive and negative 
attributes for each alternative. The farmer who is forced to 
resettle may perceive that moving to another farm would allow 
him to remain independent, close to the soil, enjoy a quiet 
life, and so on. At the same time, in looking at the alter­
native of moving to the city, such things as a shorter work
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week, greater income, and shopping conveniences may be per­
ceived as positive attributes. The rural, nonfarm situation 
may be perceived as a good place to retire, a place where 
everybody is friendly, and the cost of living is low. There 
are consonant cognitions surrounding each alternative. They 
are consonant because they "follow from" and are consistent 
with the other attitudes, values, and beliefs possessed by 
the individual who is making the decision. One alternative 
is selected and acted on and dissonance occurs. Some of the 
individual cognitions are of course consonant with the decision 
he has made. Dissonance exists because in "passing up" the 
other alternative there are cognitions surrounding the other 
alternatives which are dissonant with the decision he has made.
If the farmer decides to move to a new farm, (a) the cognitions 
surrounding the alternative of moving to a city (b) (such as a 
shorter work week and increased income) are dissonant with the 
values he possesses for these cognitions. These may be dissonant 
because "If I would have moved to the city, I'd have to work 
less."
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Figure 7
Predecisional Consonant Relations
Alternative #1 Alternative #2 Alternative #3
C on s onant C on s on an t C on s on ant
Cognitions Cognitions Cognitions
Individual's Values, Attitudes, Beliefs
solid lines _______ . consonant relations
broken lines - - - - -  dissonant relations
Figure 8
Post-Decisional Dissonant Relations
Chosen Rejected Rejected
Alternative #1 Alternative #2 Alternative #3
Consonant ~ Dissonant Dissonant
Cognitions Cognitions Cognitions
Individual's Values, Attitudes, Beliefs
solid lines __________  consonant relations
broken lines - - - - -  dissonant relations
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Theoretically, it appears that dissonance exists where forced 
resettlement has taken place as a result of decision making*
For dissonance to occur, the individual must be committed to 
the decision and behave correspondingly* "The decision must, 
imply the rejection of the unchosen alternative...if not, 
theoretically, there is no dissonance..."78
Given that dissonance exists, what is its magnitude?
Recalling s
Magnitude of Dissonance = Cognitive elements dissonant with decision
Cognitive elements consonant with decision
the problem becomes one of counting consonant and dissonant cog­
nitive elements. If the hypothetical example is followed, the 
magnitude of decisional dissonance would be determined as 
follows s
Total number of dissonant cognitions 
for rejected alternatives (2) & (3)
Dissonance = Total number of dissonant cognitions
for chosen alternatives (1) & (4) &
(5) & (6) & (7) & (8) & (9)
An additional problem would be to determine the importance
of each cognition for the three alternatives, since the impor-
79tance of the decision will affect the magnitude of the dissonance.
78J. Davidson and S. Kiesler, "Cognitive Behavior Before 
and After Decisions", in Leon Festinger, Conflict, Decisions, 
and Dissonance, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964),
pp. 10-19.
79 . . .Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance,
(Stanfords Stanford University Press, 1957), p. 37.
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The equation which allows for the quantification of im­
portance is as follows:
i
E Pli
D = EKPli = i=l = Ti 
EKP2 j 3 Tj
E P2j
j=l
Where: D = magnitude of dissonance
Pli = the importance of element i in Cluster 1 
P2j = the importance of element j in Cluster 2
K = a constant
. ^ m .80 Tl ^  T j
Precisely quantifying dissonance in the forced-resettlement, 
decision-making situation would require information and tech­
niques which are not yet available to social science. Yet, in 
a general way, the theoretical propositions about post-decisional 
dissonance do have utility in studying forced resettlement. Two 
theoretical propositions are especially pertinent; the first 
proposition being:
1* The more important the decision the greater the
81 . , . 
dissonance. This proposition suggests that a great deal of
dissonance arises in the forced-resettlement situation as a
consequence of making a migration decision. Few decisions can
on
Kiesler, Collins, and Miller, op. cit., p. 195.
^Festinger, op. cit., p. 37.
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be more important than the resettlement-migration decision. 
Consideration of one's family, friends, community ties, income, 
occupation, and, in general, one's future are important cog­
nitive elements that are involved in making the migration 
decision. Accepting then that the migration decision is indeed 
an important one, theoretically, a good deal of dissonance 
should exist after the migration decision is made, TO recapit­
ulates "The post-decisional dissonance of being forced to 
resettle and make a migration decision cannot be quantified.
The reason for discussing it is to argue and demonstrate that 
theoretically a good deal of dissonance does exist in the 
forced-resettlement situation. This suggests that all those 
who experience resettlement also experience dissonance; but a 
second proposition suggests that the magnitude of dissonance 
varies depending on the type of decision that is made,
2, The greater the similarity (cognitive overlap) be-
82tween alternatives, the smaller the amount of dissonance.
The farmer who has three new farms as his migration alternatives, 
and elects to move to one of the three, will experience less 
dissonance than the farmer who has a farm, a small town, or a 
city as his alternatives and elects to move to a farm. This 
is explained as follows:
The dissonance,•.exists between the cognitive
elements that correspond to desirable features of
82Ibid., p. 41
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the unchosen alternative and to undesirable 
features of the chosen alternative. But let 
us consider that subset of the elements that 
identically corresponds to desirable features 
of both the unchosen and the chosen alter­
natives, Clearly, these elements are not 
dissonant with cognition about the action which 
has taken place since, considered alone, they 
would lead to the action taken just as cogently 
as they would lead to the rejected action.83
To follow this theoretical proposition in making predictions 
would require that one determine the perceptual alternatives 
available to the decision maker. This would present a com­
plex task in studying mass forced resettlement. A modification 
of this proposition will allow one to make predictions about 
categories of persons who are forced to resettle.
The more similar the chosen post-decisional 
alternative is to the pre-decisional situation, 
the smaller the magnitude of dissonance.
The basis for stating such a proposition is the theoretical
statement that "the total amount of dissonance...will depend
on the proportion of relevant elements that are dissonant with
o4
the one in question". An example may help to clarify this 
proposition. A farmer who decides to move to another farm 
will experience less dissonance than a farmer who moves to a 
city. His post-decisional behavior is more consonant with 
his pre-decisional behavior (farming). In comparison to the 
farmer who moves to a small town or city, there is a greater
88jt>id.
®4Festinger, op. cit., p. 17.
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proportion of consonant cognitions than dissonant cognitions 
about his new behavior.
Figure 9
Dissonant Relationships with 
New Farm as Selected Alternative
Alternatives New Farm Small Town City
Cognitions 2,;
irf;■r5
^ 6 , 7 ^
Farmer
consonant relationssolid lines ______ _
broken lines dissonant relations
The amount of similarity between the post-decisional alternative 
and the predecisional situation affects the ratio of dissonant- 
to-consonant elements universally.
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Figure 10
Dissonant Relationships with 
City as Selected Alternative
Alternatives New Farm Small Town City
Cognitions
2r.i ,?.*.?.? ^ f 5 f 6 f 7 f Q f 9
Farmer
V 8
solid lines consonant relations
broken lines - - - - -  dissonant relations
Recalling that "the strength of the pressures to reduce
85the dissonance is a function of the magnitude of the dissonance” 
it then follows that: In forced resettlement, those persons
whose migration decision is the most similar to their pre­
settlement situation will experience the least pressure to 
reduce dissonance. The farmer who migrates to another farm 
will show less evidence of dissonance reduction than the farmer 
who migrates to the city.
Forced resettlement has been placed in a post-decisional 
dissonance framework since it requires that the people who will
85Ibid., p. 18
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be affected by resettlement make a migration decision. In the 
case of a reservoir project that is to be built in a rural 
area, three types of general migration alternatives are avail­
able. These are new farm, small town, and city, and each 
requires varying amounts of behavioral change.. Since the 
migration decision is such an important decision, theoretically, 
the magnitude of dissonance that arises is high. But, at the 
same time, it has been hypothesized that the magnitude varies 
depending on the amount of similarity between the post-decisional 
or chosen alternative and the pre-decisional situation. The 
greater the similarity the lower the magnitude of dissonance 
and, therefore, the lower the amount of pressures to reduce 
dissonance. The more the similarity between the pre-decisional 
situation and the post-decisional alternative the greater the 
proportion of consonants' cognitive elements.
Knowledge of one's behavior as a cognition is accounted 
for by the theory of cognitive dissonance. If one looks at 
the behavior change that the various migration decision alter­
natives require, it appears that selecting an alternative which 
is similar to one's pre-decisional situation requires less 
behavior change than selecting an alternative which is dis­
similar to one's pre-decisional situation. This suggests the 
possibility of hypothesizing that: The greater the amount of
behavioral change the greater t:he magnitude of dissonance; 
therefore, the greater the pressure to reduce dissonance.
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This hypothesis becomes more tenable when one places forced 
resettlement in the framework of a forced-compliance situation. 
Forced Resettlement as a Forced-Compliance Situation
Forced compliance refers to that situation where a person 
is induced to behave in a manner contrary to his own personal 
attitudes or beliefs. Reservoir projects which are character­
ized by opposition, and are built in spite of this opposition, 
seem to be a "natural" forced-compliance situation. One of 
the major bases for much of the opposition to reservoir projects 
centers on leaving one's home and land. The local people oppose 
the reservoir project (in part) because it will require them 
to give up their homes, communities, and farmlands, and migrate 
or resettle. The expression of this opposition takes varied 
forms, and a cluster of negative attitudes or cognitions about 
the reservoir develop.
Projects are often constructed in spite of this opposi­
tion. Once the project is authorized and funded, land 
acquisition begins and the local people must resettle. The 
resettlement which occurs is, in a sense, forced resettlement. 
The migration which occurs in resettlement is "forced" because 
the local people do not make the resettlement choice; rather 
the choice is made for them. The behavioral changes that re­
sult from resettlement are contrary to (or do not follow from) 
the attitudes and beliefs, expressed in opposing the reservoir 
project. The act of resettlement requires them to behave in
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a manner contrary to their personal attitudes and beliefs.
That part of the local population which expresses 
opposition to a reservoir project, and is required to resettle, 
should experience dissonance— assuming that forced resettlement 
is really a forced-compliance situation. Since dissonance is 
in itself a motivating force for dissonance reduction, this 
same population should be expected to change cognitions to 
reduce dissonance. Two factors affect the magnitude of dis­
sonance; and the magnitude of dissonance in turn affects the 
strength of the pressures to reduce it. According to Festinger, 
these two factors are: (1) the magnitude of punishment or
reward and, (2) the intensity of the attitudes and beliefs
o c.
which are discrepant with the "forced*' behavior. In the case 
of punishment and reward, an increase in either results in a 
higher proportion of consonant elements and dissonance is de­
creased, The greater the intensity with which an attitude or 
belief is held the greater the magnitude of dissonance that 
exists•
In interpreting the magnitude of punishment, as it im­
plies to forced resettlement, it seems feasible to consider 
"costs" as punishment. Costs in this sense include more than 
monetary loss; they include social costs as well.
86Ibid., p. 90
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Figure 11
Monetary and Social Cost Involved in Resettlement
Costs
Amount of land given up
Jh Lower price received than ashedrtf
+J Owner vs• tenant(D£ Decrease in income
o2 Ability to purchase equivalent landDistance of move
i— 1 Old age vs. young age
Long period of residency
•ri
u Large family at home
0
w Large degree of environmental change
Severed community ties
In forced resettlement those persons who have to give up the
■|
most (have the greatest cost), both socially and monetarily, 
should experience a relatively high degree of dissonance due 
to the high magnitude of cost. If dissonance is high, then 
the pressures for dissonance reduction are also high.
Interpreting the magnitude of rewards in the forced- 
resettlement situation does not seem feasible. The forced- 
resettlement situation is not a reward situation. . People are 
not really rewarded for resettling. The benefits they receive
•' 'K . . ‘v
come as a consequence of resettlement not as inducement to 
resettle.
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Given that one can specify the magnitude of cost in 
forced resettlement, it is also necessary to determine the 
degree of intensity with which attitudes against the reservoir 
project and resettlement are held. An indication of attitudinal 
intensity is the way in which opposition to a reservoir was 
expressed. It seems reasonable to assume that a person who 
expressed opposition by writing his congressman held more in­
tense attitudes against a project than a person who only signed 
a petition. It is felt that attitudinal intensity can be 
specified through documenting the form a person uses to express 
opposition. Determining the intensity of attitudes against a 
project and resettlement is necessary because the greater the 
intensity of an attitude that is discrepant with one's behavior, 
the greater the magnitude of dissonance; therefore, the 
greater the pressures to reduce dissonance.
Festinger then has accounted for the magnitude of cost 
and the intensity with which an attitude is held. He fails to 
explicitly account for variations in behavioral change. Be­
havioral change, as a cognitive change, is included theoretically, 
but from this point on it is treated as a constant. Variations 
in cost and attitude intensity have the effect of increasing 
or decreasing the ratio of consonant-to-dissonant cognitions. 
Theoretically, the degree of behavioral change should affect 
the magnitude of dissonance and dissonance reduction. The more 
that behavior is discrepant with one's existing attitudes and
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beliefs, the greater the number of dissonant elements that 
exist. In applying this to forced resettlements The greater 
the amount of change brought about by forced resettlement, 
the greater the magnitude of dissonance and, therefore, the 
greater the strength of the pressures to reduce dissonance. 
This suggests, for example, that a farmer who moves to a small 
town will experience a greater amount of dissonance than the 
farmer who moves to a new farm.
Figure 12
Migration Alternatives, Behavioral Change,
and
the Strength of Pressure to Reduce Dissonance
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Forced resettlement has been placed in the framework of 
a forced-compliance dissonance situation. When a reservoir 
project is opposed by the local people, the behavior that is 
brought about by forced resettlement is discrepant with the 
attitudes and beliefs of the people. The magnitude of the 
dissonance can be determined by specifying punishment in terms 
of social and monetary cost and by specifying the degree of 
intensity with which an attitude is held. It has been argued 
that a third variable will also influence the magnitude of
i
dissonance and the strength of the pressures to reduce it.
This is the variable of behavioral change. The end result of 
resettlement is behavioral change. The amount of behavioral 
change that takes place will depend, to a great extent upon 
where the people resettle.
Forced Resettlement and the Reduction of Dissonance
Since forced resettlement has been placed in the frame­
work of post-decisional and forced-compliance dissonance 
situations, it now becomes necessary to describe the ways in 
which that dissonance which arises as a consequence of resettle 
ment can be reduced. There appear to be three theoretical ways 
in which forced-resettlement dissonance can be reduced. The 
first way is through the addition of new consonant cognitions. 
This has the effect of increasing the proportion of consonant- 
to-dissonant ‘elements and .thereby reduces dissonance. The 
second mode of dissonance reduction is changing a cognition so
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that it is consonant with one's behavior, or, in other words, 
changing one's attitude and beliefs so that they are consistent 
with one's behavior* The third mode of dissonance reduction, 
which is applicable to forced resettlement, is the magnification 
of the importance of the cost to increase the consonance with 
one's behavior. As Festinger explains:
If forced compliance has been elicited, the * 
number of consonant relations may be increased 
by magnifying the importance of the reward ob­
tained or of the punishment (cost) avoided.87
In discussing forced resettlement in terms of post-decisional
and forced-compliance dissonance situations, two general
hypotheses were developed:
1. The more similarity between the chosen post-decisional 
alternative and the pre-decisional situation, the smaller the 
magnitude of dissonance.
2. The greater the amount of behavioral change brought 
about by forced compliance (forced-resettlement), the: greater 
the magnitude of dissonance. Essentially, the above two hy­
potheses can be considered as sub-hypotheses of the following 
hypothesis that: The more that behavior changes in the 
direction of being discrepant with one's existing attitudes 
and beliefs, the greater the amount of dissonance that will be 
created. The two sub-hypotheses are similar in that the amount 
of dissonance created is really a function of behavioral change.
®^Festinger, op. cit., p. 96.
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If the post-decisional alternative is similar to the pre- 
decisional situation, less behavioral change is required and 
less dissonance is created.
The theory of cognitive dissonance provides little 
direction in predicting which mode of dissonance reduction will 
be utilized, given a certain set of conditions. However, since 
greater magnitudes of dissonance create greater pressures to 
reduce dissonance, it seems reasonable to state that: Greater
pressures to reduce dissonance will require more dramatic modes 
of dissonance reduction. In situations where a large amount of 
discrepant behavior exists, dramatic modes of dissonance re­
duction will come into play. Where little discrepant behavior 
exists, there is little pressure to reduce dissonance and less 
dramatic modes of reduction are required.
The following question, then, might be asked: Of the
three modes of reduction that have applicability to forced 
resettlement, which is a dramatic mode? Festinger provides a 
clue to an answer when he states that:
It is clear that in order to eliminate a 
dissonance completely, some cognitive element 
must be changed. It is also clear that this 
is not always possible. But even if it is impos­
sible to eliminate a dissonance it is possible 
to reduce the total magnitude of dissonance by 
adding new cognitive elements.®®
The most dramatic mode, it would seem, is that mode which in­
volves a complete change of cognitive element and a complete
®®Ibid•, p. 21.
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reduction of dissonance. This is in contrast to the addition 
of new cognitions which never completely eliminates dissonance. 
Changing one's attitudes and beliefs is the most dramatic mode 
of dissonance reduction.
In the forced-resettlement situation, those people who 
experience the greatest amount of dissonance will reduce it by 
changing their attitudes and beliefs about the source of re­
settlement, i.e., the reservoir project. Those people who 
experience little dissonance will reduce it through the addition 
of new cognitions and this will not require them to change their 
attitudes and beliefs. An example of this would be the farmer 
who opposed a reservoir and resettled in a city. Dissonance 
and the pressures to reduce dissonance are high. This farmer 
reduces dissonance by changing his attitudes and beliefs about 
the source or "cause0 of his resettlement— the reservoir project. 
The farmer who moves to a new farm a few miles away from the 
reservoir will experience little dissonance and little pressure 
to reduce dissonance. He will not change his attitudes and 
beliefs about the project since there is not enough dissonance 
present. Rather, he will add new cognitions which in effect 
reinforce his attitudes and beliefs about the project. Theoreti­
cally, he is adding new consonant cognitions which increase the 
proportion of consonant-to-dissonant elements and thereby de­
creases dissonance.
Summary and Hypothesis
In discussing dissonance and forced resettlement, it has
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been argued that resettlement gives rise to dissonance in two 
ways. First, dissonance arises out of the migration decision­
making that is brought about by resettlement. Secondly, dis­
sonance arises since forced resettlement is really a forced- 
compliance situation. People who resettle are /'forced*' to 
behave in a manner that is discrepant with their existing 
attitudes and beliefs. In both situations the source of dis­
sonance is behavioral change. The more the behavior changes, 
the greater the discrepancy behavior and attitudes; therefore, 
the greater the magnitude of dissonance. More specifically, in 
the forced-resettlement situation the magnitude of dissonance 
and the strength of the pressure to reduce dissonance will be 
a function of: (1) the degree of similarity between the
pre-decisional situation and the past-decisional alternative; 
(2) the degree of social and monetary cost incurred as a result 
of resettlement, (3) the degree of behavioral change that takes 
place as a result of resettlement, and (4) the intensity with 
which negative attitudes and beliefs about the source of re- • 
settlement (reservoir project) are held.
Two modes of dissonance reduction have been specified. 
Those people who experience a high magnitude of dissonance may 
reduce it by changing their attitudes and beliefs about the 
source or "cause" of resettlement. Attitudes may be changed 
so that they ate consonant with behavior. Those people who 
experience little dissonance will not change their attitudes
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and beliefs but will add new consonant elements which will 
reduce dissonance.
This then constitutes the essential considerations in 
formulating the research hypotheses which are now listed in 
order from the most abstract to the least abstract.
1... The greater the amount of behavioral change, the 
greater the amount of attitude change.
a. Those individuals whose behavior has changed the 
most as a result of resettlement will experience the greatest 
amount of dissonance and the greatest pressures to reduce it.
b. Those persons who experience large amounts of dis­
sonance will reduce dissonance by changing their attitudes so 
as to make them consonant with their behavior•
c. Those persons whose post-decisional alternative is 
the most similar to their pre-decisional situation will ex­
perience the least dissonance.
d. Those individuals who experience little dissonance 
will not change their attitudes, but instead will reduce dis­
sonance by adding new consonant cognitions which are consistent 
with their attitudes.
Additional hypotheses ares
1. Those people who experience the greatest amount of 
social and monetary cost will also experience the greatest 
amount of dissonance and the pressures to reduce dissonance.
a. Those who experience the greatest amount of social
/
i
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and monetary cost will reduce dissonance through attitude change.
b. Those who experience the least amount of social and 
monetary cost will reduce dissonance through the addition of 
new consonant cognitions.
In introducing the notions of forced resettlement and 
cognitive dissonance, five "problems" were listed, and it was 
stated that the discussion "...should result in arriving at 
testable hypotheses which will permit investigating the follow­
ing questions". Three of these questions were:
1. Do the attitudes of local opponents to Corps reser­
voirs change over time from a negative position to a positive 
position.
2. Is there any variation as to when changes occur and 
how much they change.
3. What specifically are the bases for variation of 
attitude change and the intensity with which an attitude is held. 
Using the theory of cognitive dissonance, answers to these 
questions, in the form of hypotheses, have been offered. Pre­
dictions regarding type of attitude change, what kind of 
people change, and why they change have been made.. To test 
these hypotheses they must be stated in specific terms capable
of measurement. This will be done in the discussion of method­
ology, but prior to this it is important to describe the case 
history and field setting from which empirical data will be 
collected.
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Tuttle Creek Reservoir - A Brief History
Tuttle Creek Reservoir received Congressional authori­
zation in 1938, Initial funding and construction enabled work 
to begin in 1952 and completion was achieved in 1962. The 
reservoir is located six miles north of Manhattan, Kansas, in 
the Blue River Valley. Its boundaries, and the lands inundated, 
are parts of Marshall, Pottawatomie and Riley counties. Under 
normal operating conditions, the reservoir has a surface area 
of 15,800 acres and a storage of 2,346,000 acre-feet. The 
total cost of the project was $79,983,000. Tuttle Creek
Reservoir was built as the key flood protection project for
89Topeka, Manhattan, Lawrence, and Kansas City.
Historically, the Blue Valley was one of Kansas* earliest 
settled river valleys. Its fertile bottomlands attracted a 
variety of pioneers, and in particular it was a drawing place 
for Swedish immigrants. Thirteen small rural communities de­
veloped in the valley along with the usual rural churches and 
cemeteries of an agricultural people. Many of the farms that 
were located in the valley 'were originally homesteads and had 
been passed down from father to son. Some of the communities 
were more than one hundred years old and the families of the 
valley had developed a strong attachment to their lands and 
communities. Not only were the lands valued as a source of
8^U. S. Corps of Engineers, Kansas Water Resources 
Development. (U. S. Army Engineer Division, Southwestern,
Dallas, Texas, January 1970).
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of livelihood, but there also existed an aesthetic appreciation 
which was a result of the pioneering and ethnic backgrounds of 
the valley dwellers. Perhaps it was this aesthetic appreciation 
and attachment to the lands which was the primary basis for the 
strong opposition and conflict which surrounded the construction 
of Tuttle Creek Reservoir.
The construction of Tuttle Creek Reservoir required the 
acquisition and inundation of 61,799 acres located in the 
Blue River Valley. Nine small communities were inundated along 
with several cemeteries, rural churches, and a children's home. 
Approximately 1,625 land ownerships were affected directly 
through total acquisition or partial severance of land. The 
school districts of three counties, 644 businesses, govern­
mental tax bases, and public utilities were also disrupted.
The Corps of Engineers resettlement register indicates that 
approximately 580 heads-of-households received resettlement 
payments. A conservative estimate of the total number of persons 
involved in resettlement is 2,000.
Opposition to the reservoir project began shortly after 
its authorization in 1938. This early opposition died out 
with the advent of the Second World War, but regained vitality 
after 1945. As the years passed and construction appeared to 
be a real possibility, opposition and conflict heightened.
With an initial funding of $5,000,000 in 1952, the project be­
came a reality and opposition to the project began.
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The opposition to Tuttle Creek Reservoir was characterized 
by a variety of beliefs, sentiments, and behaviors which were 
essential components of the opposition against the reservoir 
project. Recognizing that a flood problem did exist, the local 
opposition placed themselves in a position of being able to 
offer an alternative solution. To the opposition, reservoirs 
the size of Tuttle Creek were "Big Dam Foolishness". Their 
solution, which was expressed as a belief, was the extensive 
use of small detention dams, contour terracing, and other soil 
conservation measures. They argued that America would need 
the bottomlands for the food requirements of her growing popu­
lation. A commonly held belief was that the Army Engineers 
were responsible for the plight of the local opposition. A 
local newspaper editor declared, "So long as the Army Engineers 
keep the downstream people convinced that Tuttle Creek Dam is
essential to flood protection, just so long will the agitation
90for the Blue Valley destruction continue." A report issued 
by the Blue Valley Study Association cautioned the local people 
"...not to pay much attention to the Army Engineers press re­
leases. They were written to break our 'morale' and we must
91not let them do that."
The expression of sentiments played an important part in
^Linwood L. Hodgdon, "The Battle of the Blues A Social 
System in Action", (Paper read at the Colorado State University 
Water Resources Institute, June, 1969, Fort Collins, Colorado)•
91Ibid
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forming the basis for opposition. Love for their homes, the 
beauty and productivity of their farms, the abhorance of having 
to move the graves of their loved ones, pride in local organi­
zations and activities, and references to their pioneer ancestors 
were common expressions of sentiments by the local opposition.
The common expression of these sentiments was a rallying point 
and unifying device for monetary opposition. Patriotic senti­
ments were commonly expressed— the Blue Valley fight was depicted 
as a fight to preserve the "American way of life'1.
One ramification of the opposition’s behavior was a major 
political upheval. In the November election of 1952, the 
Republican incumbent from the First Congressional District was 
defeated by a Democrat. . This representative, who was "pro dam", 
had defeated Democrats by a margin of 2 to 1 four times since 
1945. The Democrat who won the election was a 73-year old 
farmer who opposed the dam and supported conservation measures. 
Another common form of collective oppositional behavior was a 
number of "prayer meetings" held at the damsite and attended by 
several hundred valley residents. One function of these meet­
ings was the building of religious support for the "righteousness
of the opponent's course". At one meeting a local minister pro-
92claimed that "Nothing so wrong can ultimately win". Another
^Taken from an unidentified newspaper clipping located 
in the project history files of the U. S. Army Engineers,
Kansas City District.
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minister declared, "We are here to ask God's help in preventing 
the construction of the dam,•.Let us not underestimate the 
power of God, for the miracle of Phillipi is not impossible in 
our day". This particular meeting closed with Kipling's 
Recessional, "Lord God of Hosts be with us yet, /Lest we forget, 
/Lest we forget."
Hostility and vandalism were normative forms of expressing 
opposition. The Army Engineers were consistently refused per­
mission to enter farmers' fields. In one incident they were 
threatened with stones and in another with a pitchfork. Van­
dalism to government vehicles and equipment was common occurrence. 
Even today, almost five years since completion, one farmer who 
has refused to leave his acquired farm greets government vehicles 
with a shotgun.
A great deal more could be said about the opposition to 
Tuttle Creek Reservoir, but for the purpose of this research, 
the research project is being used as a non-experimental case 
which will permit the testing of a theory. Tuttle Creek was 
selected because of the amount of opposition and conflict that 
surrounded it. Many personnel of the Corps of Engineers consider 
it as the most opposition and conflict-laden project they ever 
built•
In 1954 the Manhattan Chamber of Commerce found its mem­
bers divided in opinion on whether Tuttle Creek Reservoir 
should be completed. In an attempt to resolve the conflict
«
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among membership it was decided that the Chamber would sponsor 
a "referendum type of poll" of all citizens in the area. 
Apparently, the results of the survey would be used to under­
mine one of the two conflicting Chamber of Commerce opinions 
regarding completion. The "Mid-Kansas Research Institute" con­
ducted the survey by mailing a questionnaire to "every family
93served by the United States Postal System in the area"•
Table 1 illustrates more specifically the location of those 
receiving the questionnaire.
Table 1
Location of Respondents of the 
Mid-Kansas Research Institute Survey
Total
All families 7,839
Blue River Valley 532
Manhattan (city) 5,329
Manhattan (rural) 1,077
Rest of County 901
The results of the survey suggest that physical prox­
imity to the reservoir and the urban-rural dimension are related 
to whether or not one favored or opposed completion of the
^^Mid-Kansas Research Institute, F. L. Whan, Analyst, 
"Referendum Vote of Families in Riley County and the Blue River 
Valley on the Subject of Tuttle Creek Dam Completion",
(June 1954).
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project. Those families living in the river valley who would 
be directly affected in terms of land acquisition expressed 
the highest degree of opposition, whereas those families in 
urban Manhattan were the greatest source of those respondents 
in favor of completion.
Table 2
Results of Mid-Kansas Research Institute Survey
(1954)
Against For Don’t Know Total
Blue Valley families 93.5 5.2 1.3 100
Manhattan urban 55.2 39.2 5.6 100
Manhattan rural 68.0 27.8 4.2 100
Rest of County 67.0 25.6 7.4 100
All families 61.3 33.5 5.2 100
The opposition achieved some success after*1952, When 
the initial construction funds ran out, no additional funds 
were appropriated until 1955. During this two-year lag, 
Congressional hearings on whether or not the project should be 
continued were held. Several of the local opponents appeared 
as witnesses at these hearings, and a special delegation of 
housewives made a trip to the White House where they requested 
the President’s intervention. During this same period, the 
valley residents hired a film company to make a film depicting 
their struggle to save the valley. This film received
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widespread distribution and the story that it told was supple­
mented by articles in several nationally circulated magazines.
The final decision was made by Congress in 1955. In 
appropriating additional construction funds, Congress gave 
approval to the continuance and eventaully the completion of 
the reservoir. From 1955 through completion was the period in 
which most of the resettlement took place. The people who re­
settled, as a consequence of the construction of Tuttle Creek 
Reservoir, constitute the population for this research project.
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Chapter 4
METHODOLOGY
The Hypotheses and Measurement 
The Hypothe8e3
A brief description of the setting for the test of hy­
potheses has been presented. The specific measurements that 
will be used in testing the hypotheses must now be discussed.
In discussing measurement and operations, methodological 
limitations will also be considered.
Perhaps the first question that requires consideration 
is "Can dissonance be measured?" Generally, attempts at 
measuring dissonance directly are uncommon. Indirect measure­
ment of dissonance is the usual case and it is achieved by 
measuring the manifestations of dissonance reduction which are 
specified prior to measurement. Probably this emphasis on 
indirect measurement has resulted because researchers have been 
more interested in the consequences of dissonance than in dis­
sonance itself. The consequences of dissonance are the bases 
of the theory’s utility. The interest of this research is 
also in the consequence of dissonance, not in dissonance itself. 
For this reason, three of the hypotheses which have been pre­
sented will npt be tested directly. Instead they will be treated 
as postulates. These three postulates ares
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1* Those individuals whose behavior has changed most 
as a result of resettlement will experience the greatest amount 
of dissonance and the greatest pressures to reduce it.
2. Those persons whose post-decisional alternative is 
the most similar to their pre-decisional situation will ex­
perience the least dissonance.
3. Those people who experience the greatest amount of 
social and monetary cost experience the greatest amount and 
pressures to reduce dissonance.
These three hypotheses will receive indirect treatment 
through the testing of the following general (GH) and specific 
(SH) hypotheses.
(GH1) The greater the amount of behavioral change, the 
greater the amount of attitude change.
(SHI-1) Those persons who moved from a farm to a city, 
or from a small town to a city will have changed their atti­
tudes about Tuttle Creek Reservoir. N
(SHI-2) Those persons who moved from a farm to a new
farm, or from a farm to a small town near the reservoir will
not have changed their attitudes about Tuttle Creek Reservoir.
(SHI-3) Those persons who have not changed their atti­
tudes will possess other attitudes which support their negative 
attitude about the reservoir project.
(SHI-4) Those persons who possessed the strongest nega­
tive attitudes about the reservoir project will have changed
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their attitudes about Tuttle Creek#
(SHI-5) Those persons who experience the greatest amount 
of social and monetary cost will change their attitudes the 
most.
On the surface, two of the hypotheses appear to be in 
contradiction. One maintains that attitude change is a 
function of behavioral change; the other that attitude change 
is a function of cost. These two hypotheses will be brought 
out of contradiction by an additional hypothesis:
(SHI-6) Those persons who experience the greatest 
monetary and social cost as a result of resettlement will also 
experience the greatest amount of behavioral change.
To test the hypotheses, six measurements have to be made. 
These are: (l) attitude change, (2) pre-settlement attitude,
(3) behavioral change, (4) attitude intensity, (5) social and 
monetary cost, and (6) new attitudes supporting anti-reservoir 
attitudes.
Attitude Change
To assess attitude change, a measure of attitudes before 
resettlement and after resettlement is necessary. The "before" 
attitudes were determined through existing documents which are 
of an opposition nature. The documents used were: Letters of
opposition sent to the Corps, signatures on petitions opposing 
the project, records of Congressional testimony, and newspaper 
articles. These documents were used to determine whether or
101
not a given person opposed Tuttle Creek Reservoir, The assump­
tion was that, if he opposed it, he had negative attitudes 
toward the project. The "after" measure of attitudes toward 
Tuttle Creek Reservoir was made using a questionnaire contain­
ing Likert-type items designed specifically for this purpose.
Attitude Intensity
Since the magnitude of dissonance is in part a function 
of the intensity with which an attitude is held, it was necessary 
to make an assessment of the intensity of the pre-settlement 
(before) attitudes about the project. An assessment of intensity 
was made by using the way in which a given person opposed the 
project as an indicator. For example, it is assumed that a 
person who joined and participated in an anti-reservoir organi­
zation possessed more intense anti-reservoir attitudes than did 
a person who only signed a petition. Five categories of inten­
sity were developed based on the expression of opposition. The 
categories of opposition are listed in Figure 13. The category 
representing the highest degree of attitude intensity is 
"Participation in activities which demonstrated opposition" 
and the category representing the lowest degree of attitude 
intensity is "Word of mouth"•
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Figure 13
Forms of Expressing Opposition 
and Subsequent Attitude Intensity
High
ATTITUDE
INTENSITY
Low
Attitude intensity as indicated by the expression of opposition 
was determined by using the same existing documents that were 
used to determine measure of the "before” attitudes.
Behavioral Change
It has been argued that certain types of migration al­
ternatives are characterized by differing amounts of behavioral 
change. Moving from the farm to the city is defined as result­
ing in greater amounts of behavioral change than does moving 
from one farm to another farm. The indicator used to assess 
the degree of behavioral change that resulted as a consequence 
of resettlement was the migration destination itself. Figure 14 
lists the possible migration moves and gives an indication of 
the degree of behavioral change characterized by each move.
Participated m  activities which 
demonstrated opposition.
Joined an organization, •
Wrote a Government official. 
Signed a petition.
Word of mouth.
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F igure 14
Migration Moves and Behavioral Change
From To
(Before Location) (After Location)
CD
High
Cn
£ Farm Urban
rtf
jij Farm Rural Nonfarm
o o Farm Farm
(D rH
cu rtf 
S-l u 
tn O
(1) -H
Q  £  rtf
rCQ)m
Low
High
Rural Nonfarm Urban
Rural Nonfarm
Low
Rural Nonfarm
Social and Monetary Cost
Several items were used in evaluating the social and
monetary cost for each subject. One set of items assessed
monetary costs and a second set social cost.
Figure 15
Social and Monetary Cost Items
Monetary Cost Social
. Decrease in Income Years of residence prior
to resettlement
Non-■replacibility of land Age
Owner v s • tenant Family size
104
The monetary items were concerned with possible financial 
losses that resulted from resettlement. These losses take 
different forms such as a loss of income, not being able to 
buy an equivalent number of acres, and whether or not one has 
a capital investment (owner). Social tosts" were more diffi­
cult to assess. Financial values can be more easily assessed 
than social cost. Conceptually, social costs are not well 
defined. In general, as they are used in this research case, 
they refer to social ties and established patterns of social 
interaction that are severed and disrupted as a result of re­
settlement. It was felt that the longer a person had resided 
in the valley prior to project construction, the older a person 
was, and the larger a person's family was, the more that person 
had to give up. In other words, this person experienced "high" 
social cost.
Supporting- Anti-Reservoir Attitudes
One hypothesis maintained that those people who did not 
change their attitudes about the reservoir would add new cog­
nitions in the form of attitudes which would support their 
existing anti-reservoir attitude. This hypothesis was referring 
to those persons who purchased a new farm or moved to a small 
town a short distance away from where they lived prior to 
project construction. At present, these,persons would be 
living in the shadow of Tuttle Creek Reservoir. These same 
persons opposed the reservoir but nevertheless are living near
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it. The project was built in spite of their opposition, and 
living near it is a daily reminder of its existence. Simply 
giving up the negative attitude would be a painful experience 
in that it would be like saying, "I was wrong and they were 
right". Instead of changing their attitudes the hypothesis 
maintained that they would possess new attitudes which supported 
the anti-reservoir attitude. For these people the reservoir 
project is still a "bad" project but the reason it was built 
is because of "bad" government, "bad" Congressmen, or some 
other similar reason. Before assessing these "new anti-reservoir 
attitudes" it was necessary to specify the characteristics of 
the attitudes. It was felt that they would in part be determined 
experimentally, based on the fact that these persons opposed 
the reservoir, yet it was built. Srole-type alienation items
• , Q4
were included in the questionnaire. For example, "there is 
little use writing in public officials because often they are 
not really interested in the problems of the average man". In 
opposing the reservoir, many of these people wrote their 
Congressmen and yet the project was built. It was thought 
measures of alienation could be used as indicators of the pos­
session of new supportive anti-reservoir attitudes. This same 
hypotheses is saying that those people who did not change their
^ L e o  Sro1e> "Socia1 Integration and Certain Corolaries;
An Exploratory Study"/'American Sociological Review, 21 
(December 1965), pp. 709-716; see also Dorothy L. Meier and 
Wendell Bell, "Anomia and Differential Access to the Achievement 
of Life's Goals", American Sociological Review, 24 (April 1959), 
pp. 189-202; Delbert C. Miller, "Minnesota Survey of Opinion 
(short form)," in Handbook of Research Design and Social 
Measurement, (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1964),
pp. 152-173.
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attitude about the reservoir will score high on measures of 
alienation.
The Population and Sample
The population was defined as all those heads-of-households 
who opposed Tuttle Creek Reservoir and who were resettled as a 
consequence of its construction. Army Corps of Engineers re­
settlement research listed 580 persons. Using historic 
documents it was determined that 458 of these persons opposed 
the reservoir. This does not suggest that the remaining 122 
persons who resettled did not oppose the project. Whether or 
not they opposed it could not be determined from the documents 
that were available. Using the criteria of opposition and re­
settlement resulted in a population of 458 cases. Initially, 
no sampling procedures were used since the total population was 
to be studied. Using random sampling techniques, a sample of 
the non-respondents was made after the initial data collection 
phase.
The Questionnaire
The questionnaire (Appendix A) was designed for use as 
a mail questionnaire. Basically, three types of items were 
included; (1) personal, characteristics, (2) attitudes about 
the reservoir, and (3) selected items from measures of alienation. 
Initially, the questionnaire contained 76 items but through pre­
testing and review, 22 items were eliminated due to unclarity 
and length. In its final form, the questionnaire contained
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54 items. Extra items which would allow for consistency checks 
were also included. The control variables of social class, 
sex, age, and marital status are accounted for by questionnaire 
items•
Data Collection and Response
All of the population (458 cases) were mailed a ques­
tionnaire which was accompanied by an explanatory letter 
(Appendix B) and a stamped envelope. A cutoff date was set 
which would allow a four-week period for initial response. At 
the end of the four-week period 219 subjects had responded 
which made an initial return of 47.8 percent. A follow-up 
letter (Appendix C) with another Questionnaire was sent to the 
non-respondents. This follow-up resulted in an additional 44 
responses which increased the total response by 9.6 percent.
The total response received through the mail was 263 responses 
or 57.4 percent. The use of the mail questionnaire is charac­
terized by the problem of self-selection which is likely to 
produce a bias. The possibility exists that non-respondents 
differ significantly from respondents. This problem was dealt 
with by drawing randomly a 15 percent sample of the non-respondents. 
Personal interviews were then conducted and responses were re­
ceived from 31 of the 33 subjects in the sample. This increased 
the percentages of return by an additional 6.7 percent. The 
total return was 294 resppnses or 64.1 percent. Of the total 
return only seven of the responses were not usable. Letters
108
were received from next of kin indicating that four percent of 
the population were deceased. Collecting data from one part of 
the population by mail and another part through interviews can 
produce the additional problem of interviewer effect. The 
possibility exists that the presence of an interviewer may cause 
the subjects to respond differently than if they had responded 
by mail. To provide a control for this, five percent (12) of 
the respondents were also interviewed.
Table 3 
Summary of Returns
Collection Phase Number Percent
Initial mail 219 47.8
Follow up m$il 44 9.6
Interviews 31 6.7
TOTAL 294 64.1
Non-usable responses 7 1.5
FINAL RETURN 287 62.6
100 percent = 458
Comparison of Returns
. "v
A null hypothesis was tested to compare the differences ' 
in response betwee^ the mail-interview respondents (256), the 
interview respondents (31), and the mail-interview respondents 
(12)• The null hypothesis was that the three different groups
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•were from a common population. An analysis of variance test
was done and the plan was to use the F ratio as a test of
significance. The three groups were compared on the attitude
and alienation items. In conducting the analysis of variance,
the mean square between the groups was smaller than the mean
square within the groupsy therefore, it was concluded that
95 »there was no reason to reject the null hypothesis.
Q C
"Only values of F, greater than 1 will provide evidence 
against the null hypothesis in which we are interested. If the 
mean square between groups is smaller than the mean square within 
groups, the value of F will be less than 1, and such values will 
not contradict the null hypothesis. In this case, there is no 
need to compute the F ratio for it is obvious that the data offers 
no evidence1 against the null hypothesis." In comparing the re­
sponse, F ratios of .73 and .81 were obtained. See Allen L. 
Edwards, Statistical Methods for the Behavioral Sciences.
(New Yorks Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964), p. 322.
Chapter 5
THE FINDINGS
Analysis
The seven testable hypotheses will now be stated in the
null form and tested.
The first general hypothesis (GH1) is: The greater the
amount of behavior change, the greater the amount of attitude
change. Stated as a null hypothesis (ho-1):
There is no difference in attitude change 
between those who change behavior and those who 
do not change behavior.
In this hypothesis behavior is treated as the independent vari
able and attitude change as the dependent variable. In the
discussion of methodology it was pointed out that migration
destination would be used as an indicator of behavioral change
Table 4
Frequency of Migration Destinations 
and Behavioral Change
Number Percent
Urban 93 32.4 High
Amount of
Rural Nonfarm 133 46.3 Behavioral
Change
. . Rural Farm 61 29.2 Low
TOTAL 287 100.0
Ill
Table 4 provides a breakdown of the frequency of migration des­
tinations and behavioral change. Of the 287 respondents, 32,4 
percent resettled in urban settings, 46,3 percent in rural 
nonfarm settings, and 29.2 percent in farm settings. The de­
pendent variable, attitude change, was measured with Likert-type 
items which offered the respondent five alternatives. If a 
respondent had a mean score of three or greater on the attitude 
items, that respondent was placed in the "no change" category,
A score of less than three indicated attitude change and the 
respondent was placed in the "change" category. As shown in 
Table 5, 42,2 percent of the respondents changed their attitudes 
about Tuttle Creek Reservoir and 57,8 percent gave no indication 
of attitude change.
Table 5 
Attitude Change
Number Percent
Attitude Change 121 42.2
No Attitude Change 166 57.8
TOTAL 287 100.0
This general hypothesis relating behavioral change and attitude 
change can be tested as it stands, and also receive additional 
treatment by testing two specific hypotheses.
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(SHI-1) Those persons who moved from a farm to a city 
or from a small town to a city will have changed their atti­
tudes about Tuttle Creeh Reservoir.
(SHI-2) Those persons who moved from a farm to a new 
farm, or from a farm to a small town will not have changed 
their attitudes about Tuttle Creeh Reservoir. Since migration 
destinations and attitude change can be dealt with as 'discrete 
variables, they are susceptible to treatment with the chi 
square statistic.
Table 6
Behavioral Change and Attitude Change
Behavioral Change
High Low
Urban Rural Nonfarm Farm
Change 89 24 8
Attitude Change
No Change . 4 109 53
x2 = 102.65 df = 2
A chi square value of 102.65 was obtained and in entering the 
chi square table^ with two degrees of freedom (k-1) the value
^ I n  analyzing this thesis data, statistical values which 
fail to meet or surpass the .05 level will result in non-rejection 
of the null.,hypo these s.
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is significant at the ,01 level. Since the obtained results 
would occur by chance only once in a hundred times, the null 
hypothe sis that:
There is no difference in attitude change between 
those who change behavior and those who do not is 
therefore rejected. The conclusion is that it is 
highly probable that the greater the behavioral 
change the greater the attitude change.
Comparing attitude change for the migration destination 
categories, urban - rural farm; urban - rural nonfarm; and 
rural nonfarm - rural farm; provides a more detailed analysis. 
Table 7 provides a comparison of migration alternatives and 
the. frequency of attitude change.
Table 7
Summary Table for all 
Migration Destinations and Attitude Change
Urban Rural Farm Urban Rural Nonfarm
Change 89 8 Change 89 24
Attitude Attitude
Change Change
No Change 4 53 No Change 4 109
Xc2 = 104.34 Xc2 = 123.3
df = 1 df = 1
Rural Nonfarm Rural Farm
Change 24 8
Attitude
Change
No Change 109 53
Xc2 = .37 
df = 1
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Essentially, the results for urban-rural farm and urban-rural 
nonfarm comparisons are the same.
Table 8
Comparison of Attitude Change for Urban 
and Rural Nonfarm Respondents .
Urban Rural Farm
Change 89 8
Attitude Change
No Change 4
Xc2 = 104.34
df as 1
53
Again, the chi square statistic can be used in making the
urban-rural farm comparison. Since there is only one degree of
2freedom, chi square was corrected for continuity and an Xc
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(chi square corrected) value of 104.34 was obtained. En­
tering the chi square table with one degree of freedom, the 
2
Xc value is significant at the .01 level. The null hypoth­
esis (hol-l) that is rejected is:
no difference exists in attitude change between 
those who resettle in an urban setting and those 
who resettle in a rural farm setting.
^^Huntsberger, David V., Elements of Statistical 
Inference, (Allyn and Bacon, Boston, 1967), p. 128.
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In comparing urban and rural nonfarm, on attitude 
change, there is only one degree of freedom. Chi square was 
corrected for continuity and a value of 123.3'was obtained. 
Entering the chi square table with one degree of freedom and 
an Xc2 value of 123.3 results in the level of signigicance 
being .01. This results in rejecting the null hypothesis and 
suggests that there are significant differences in attitude 
change between those who resettle in urban settings and those 
who resettled in rural nonfarm settings.
Table 9
Comparison of Attitude Change for 
Urban and Rural-Nonfarm Respondents
Urban Rural-Nonfarm
Change 89 24
Attitude Change
No Change 4
Xc2 = 123.3 
. df = 1
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A comparison of rural nonfarm and rural farm results in
2 2 a Xc of .37. A Xc of .37 is not a significant value and,
therefore, it is concluded that the difference in attitude
change that exists between those who resettled in rural-nonfarm
settings and those who resettled in rural-farm settings occur
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by chance. The null hypothesis (hol-2) cannot be rejected 
that:
a significant difference in attitude change 
exists between those who resettle in rural-nonfarm 
and rural-farm settings.
Table 10
Comparison of Attitude Change for 
Rural Nonfarm and Rural Farm
Rural Nonfarm Rural Farm 
Change 24 8
Attitude Change
No Change 109 53
Xc2 = .37 
df = 1
Attitude Change and Alienation
One of the hypotheses (SHI-3) held that: Those persons
who have not changed their attitudes will possess other atti­
tudes which support their negative attitudes about the reser­
voir project. The null hypothesis (hol-3) is:
that those persons who have not changed their 
attitudes will not possess other attitudes which 
support their negative attitudes about the reser­
voir project.
In the discussion on methodology it was specified that these
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"other attitudes" would be indicated by agreement with measures 
of alienation. Those persons who have not changed their atti­
tudes will score high on alienation measures. In this hypothesis, 
attitude change is the independent variable and alienation is 
the dependent variable. Standardized alienation items ° were 
used to assess whether or not a respondent was alienated. Both 
three-alternative and five-alternative items were used. A mean 
score of 3 or greater on the five alternative items indicated 
alienation, and a mean score of -two on the three alternative 
items indicated alienation. An alienation score was computed 
by averaging the final scores of the three and five alternative 
items. A respondent whose final average score was 2.5 or 
greater was placed in the "alienated category". With one degree 
Of freedom, chi square was corrected for continuity and an 
Xc^ value of 123.3 was obtained. This value (Xc^ = 123.3) is
significant at the .01 level; therefore, the null hypothesis is
, /
rejected.
Table 11 
Attitude Change and Alienation
Chance No Change
Alienated 8 121
Alienation
N on-Al i enaif ed 113
N = 287 
Xc2 = 123.3
45
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Attitude Intensity and Attitude Change.
It was hypothesized that: (SHI-4) Those persons who
possessed the strongest negative attitudes about the reservoir 
project will have changed their attitudes the most. In the 
null form (hol-4):
No difference in attitude change will exist 
between those who possessed strongest negative 
attitudes and those who possessed the weakest 
negative attitudes.
Data was collected using five categories of attitude 
intensity which were assigned a weighted value. These cate­
gories are presented in Table 12.
Table 12
Weighted Values for the Measurement of 
Attitude Intensity
Weighted Value Forms of Expression
High 1 Participated in 
activities which 
demonstrated opposition
2 . Joined an organization
Attitude Intensity 3 Wrote a government 
official
4 Signed a petition
Low 5 Expressed opposition 
by word of mouth
They are not exclusive since a respondent can be placed in any
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or all categories. The nonrespondents were divided into two
groups, those who changed their attitudes and those who did
not change their attitudes, A mean value for each attitude
intensity category was then calculated for each group. In
examining the mean values for attitude-change and no-change
groups (Table 13), very little difference exists. An analysis
of variance was conducted and the F ratio used to test'for
significance. Since the F ratio obtained was not larger than
991, no evidence existed for rejecting the null hypothesis.
The low F value of ,058 largely results from the low amount of 
variation between groups (Table 14), The obtained value of 
the sum of squares for variation between groups was only .12,
Table 13
Mean Values of Attitude Intensity Scores for 
Attitude-Change and No-Change Groups
Attitude Change No Change
Participated in activities ,387 .442
which demonstrated opposition’
Joined an organization .839 1.368
Wrote a government official 1.484 1.587
Signed a petition 3.258 3.351
Word of mouth 2.140 2.451
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The low F value of ,058 provides no basis for rejecting the 
null hypothesis. Therefore, it is concluded that no support 
exists for the hypothesis that: Those persons who possessed
the. strongest negative attitudes about the reservoir project 
will.-have changed their attitudes the most.
Table 14
Variation Between and Within Attitude-Change and 
No-Change Groups on Attitude Intensity
Source of Variation Sum of Squares df Mean Square
Between groups .12 1 .12
Within groups 6.36 8 .79
TOTAL 6.48 10
F = .658 df a= (kn-1)
Cost and Attitude Change
The hypothesis (SHI-5) that: Those persons who experience
the greatest amount of social,and monetary cost will change 
their attitudes the most, can also be tested by conducting an 
analysis of variance and an F test. Once again the respondents 
are divided into two groups, those who changed their attitudes 
and those who did not change their attitudes. The null hypothesis 
(hol-5) is that:
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No significant difference exists on the cost 
item scores of the two groups.
Mean scores were calculated on each cost item for the two groups.
Table 15
Mean Values of Social and Monetary Cost Scores for 
Attitude-change and NO-Change Groups
Cost Items Attitude-Change Group No-Attitude Change Group
Age 55.20 52.50
Marital Status 1.34 1.40
Family Size 2.38 2.12
Income Decrease 2.94 2.55
Land Ownership 1.30 1.12
Table 16
Variation Between and Within Attitude-Change and 
No-Change Groups on Social and Monetary Cost
Source of Variation Sum of Squares df Mean Square
Between groups * 76.80 1 76.80
Within groups 4.249.26 8 547.75
TOTAL 4,326.06 9
F = 7.03 df = (kn-1)
In tahing the obtained F ratio value of 7.03 and entering the
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F table with eight and one degrees of freedom, it is found that 
the value is not large enough to reject the null hypothesis.
Thus, the variation between groups (Table 16) as expressed in 
terms of the sum of squares is quite low in comparison to the 
variation within qroups. There is reason to believe that the 
two groups come from the same population. Therefore, differences 
which occur in regard to the cost items probably occur by chance. 
Cost and Behavioral Change
The remaining hypothesis (SHI-6) to be tested is: Those
persons who experience the greatest monetary and social cost 
as a result of resettlement will also experience the greatest 
behavioral change. As a null hypothesis (hol-6):
No differences exist in behavioral change be­
tween those who experience high social and monetary 
cost and those who experience low social and 
monetary cost.
The same procedure used to test the two other ••cost" hypotheses 
can be used to test this one. Average cost values are calcu­
lated for each behavioral change group. These average cost 
values are presented in Table 17.
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Table 17
Mean Values of Social and Monetary Cost Scores for 
Behavioral Change Groups
High Behavioral Change Low
Cost Items Urban Rural Nonfarm Farm
Age 55.20 53.20 51.90
Marital Status 1.34 1.44 1.36
Family Size 2.38 1.64 2.60
Income Decrease 2.94 2.17 3.00
Land Ownership 1.30 1.05 1.20
As can be seen in Table 18, the variation within groups was 
much greater than the variation between groups. In entering 
the F table with two and twelve degrees of freedom, the obtained 
F of 1.31 is not large enough to reject the null hypothesis; 
therefore, the original hypothesis is not supported and must be 
rejected.
Table 18
Variation Between and Within Behavioral Change Grpups
on Social and Monetary Cost
Source of Variation Sum of Squares df Mean Square
Between groups 486.76 2 243.30
Within groups 2,225.89 
F = 1.3 df = (kn-1)
12 185.49
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Some hypotheses have been supported and others have been 
rejected. The statistical results and the acceptance and re­
jection of hypotheses require interpretation in order to make 
them meaningful. This is the goal of the final chapter.
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Chapter 6
INTERPRETATION OF THE FINDINGS 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS
In an earlier- discussion, it was pointed out that the 
problem under consideration was relating attitude change to 
behavioral change# By dealing with this problem it was felt 
that three practical problems could be studied#
1# Do the attitudes of local opponents to Corps of 
Engineers reservoirs change over time from a negative position 
to a positive position?
2. Is there any variation as to who changes and how. 
much they change, i#e., does the generalization hold?
3. What specifically are the bases for variation of 
attitude change and variation in the intensity with which an 
attitude is held?
i
In order to collect data which would offer tentative 
answers to these questions, it was felt that the guidance of a 
theory capable of relating attitude change to behavioral change 
was necessary# The search for such a theory led to the use of 
the cognitive dissonance theory, with forced resettlement, 
attitude change, and behavioral change being placed within the 
general framework of the theory. This led to predictions in 
the form of hypotheses about attitude change and its basis in 
the forced resettlement situation# The testing of these
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hypotheses provided an opportunity to test the predictiveness 
of the theory of cognitive dissonance. The data collected to 
test the hypotheses also provides tentative answers to the 
practical questions.
Resettlement and Attitude Change
In the study of Tuttle Creek Reservoir, one of the goals 
was to discover how many of the persons who had opposed the 
construction changed their attitudes after the project was com­
pleted, Two other goals were to discover who changed and what 
was the basis for change. The data collected from 287 persons 
who opposed Tuttle Creek Reservoir and were resettled provides 
some of the following tentative answers. In considering 
attitude change,* 42,2 percent of the respondents had changed 
their attitudes about Tuttle Creek Reservoir since it was 
completed,
Table 19 
Frequency of Attitude Change
Number Percent
Attitude Change 121 42.2
No Attitude Change 166 57.8
287 100.0
It was hypothesized that those persons who changed their atti­
tudes would be those persons whose behavior had changed the
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most. It was defined that those persons whose behavior changed 
the greatest would be those persons who resettled in urban 
places. The data provided support for these contentions since 
95.6 percent of those respondents who resettled in urban places 
changed their attitudes, and only 18.0 percent and 13.1 percent 
of the rural nonfarm and rural farm resettlers, respectively, 
changed their attitudes.
These results suggest that those persons who move to 
urban places from rural farm and rural nonfarm places will 
change their attitudes the most.
Table 20
Frequency of Resettlement Alternatives and
Attitude Change
Resettlement Frequency Attitude Change
Urban 93 32.4 89 95.6
Rural Nonfarm 133 46.3 24 18.0
Rural Farm 61 29.2 8 13.1
If the argument that the urban migration destination brings 
about the greatest amount of behavioral change is correct, then 
the data appears to suggest that the basis for attitude change 
is behavioral change. The values for the measures of associ- 
ation (rtf = .72) and test of significance (X = 102.65) support
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the behavioral change— attitude change hypothesis at highly 
probable levels. Since no significant differences in attitude 
change existed between those who resettled on farms and those 
resettled in rural towns, it is assumed that selecting these 
migration alternatives does not require a sufficient amount of 
behavioral change to bring about attitude change. In collapsing 
the rural nonfarm respondents and the farm respondents' into one 
category (Table 21), the attitude change relationship receives 
even greater support.
Table 21
Frequency of Behavioral Change and 
Attitude Change
Behavioral Change
High Low
Attitude Change 89; 31.0% 32 11.1%
No Attitude Change 4 1.4%____  162 56.4%
N = 287 = 100.0%
Some tentative answers can now be given to the three 
practical questions that were raised. First, the research 
results suggest that at least part of the opponents change 
their attitudes over time about the reservoir project. Second, 
the generalization that "all" or even "most" of the opponents
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to a reservoir project change their attitudes from a negative 
to a positive state is not supported by this research case, 
since 57.8 percent of the respondents had not changed their 
attitudes. Thirdly, it appears that the basis for attitude 
change in the forced-resettlement situation is behavioral change 
as it is brought about by difference in migration alternatives.
It must be emphasized that in concluding that behavioral change 
is the basis for attitude change the conclusion is only ten­
tative. The correctness of this conclusion rests upon the 
correctness of the definition that the amount of behavioral 
change is determined by and therefore indicated by different 
types of migration alternatives. This research did not inves­
tigate the correctness of the definition. Instead, the definition 
was presented and its correctness was assumed.
An alternative explanation for attitude change might 
revolve around financial gains as the basis for attitude change. 
This explanation would contend that those people who resettled 
and as a consequence increased their income would change their 
attitude about Tuttle Creek Reservoir. The result of this re­
search can offer no support for such a contention. In conduct^ 
ing an analysis of variance for the cost items, no significant 
differences were obtained for the attitude change versus the 
no-attitude change groups. Although this suggests no relation­
ship between income and attitude change, there is at least one 
methodological reason why no significant relationship was
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established. Income distribution for the population studied 
was quite homogeneous. Only six respondents reported incomes 
of $9,000 or more, and the majority (83.4 percent) reported 
incomes of $2,000- $4,000. Of the six cases earning over 
$9,000, three showed evidence of attitude chanqe and three had 
not changed their attitudes• Because of the homogeneity in 
income, not enough difference exists to provide an adequate 
test of the contention that attitude change is a function of 
financial increase. This possibility would have to be tested 
in a case where greater disparity in income exists.
Attitude Chanqe and Alienation
One hypothesis derived from the theory of cognitive 
dissonance was that those persons who did not change their 
attitudes would score high on measures of alienation. The 
theoretical contention is that dissonance can be reduced by 
adding new consonant cognitive elements which have the effect 
of changing the ratio of dissonant to consonant elements. It 
was argued that those persons who chose to remain in the Tuttle 
Creek area would not change their attitudes but would retain 
their anti-reservoir attitudes and support them with new 
attitudes about the construction of the reservoir. It was 
specified that these new attitudes would be experientially 
derived and take the form of alienation. Those persons who 
opposed the project experienced many of the things measured by 
alienation scales. This experience of alienation is true for
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all who opposed the project regardless of where they moved.
The research results demonstrate that only certain segments of 
the study population are characterized by alienation at the 
present time.
Table 22
Frequency of Alienation and Attitude Change
Frequency Attitude Change
of Alienation Change No Change
N % N % N %
Alienated 129 44.9% 8 6.2% 121 93.8%
N on-Ali enated 158 55.1% 113 73.5% 45 26.5%
Of those persons who did not change their attitudes, 93.8 per­
cent scored high on the alienation items. It should be recalled 
those persons who did not change their behavior did not change 
their attitudes. Generally speaking, these were the people who 
remained in the Tuttle Creek area. The measure of association 
(r& = .66) demonstrated a strong relationship between attitude 
change and alienation, and the Xc value (123.3) indicated the 
relationship to be highly significant. The evidence does appear 
to support the hypothesis that: Those persons who have not
changed their attitudes will possess other attitudes which 
support their negative attitudes about the reservoir project.
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A functional explanation can be offered for the fact that those 
persons who did not change their attitude about Tuttle Creek 
at present score high on items of alienation. It appears that 
alienation can be functional in reducing dissonance. Alienation 
provides support to existing dissonant relationships by chang­
ing the ratio of consonant to dissonant relations. Anti­
reservoir attitudes, plus alienation, make the previously dis­
sonant relations consonant.
Attitude Chancre and Cost
No evidence exists for the hypotheses that attitude 
change is a function of social and financial cost. The low F 
ratios (7.03, 1.31) obtained in testing the hypotheses suggest 
that they should not be retained. These hypotheses were 
directly derived from the theory of cognitive dissonance. Lack 
of support for the hypothesis can possibly be accounted for by 
the homogeneity of the population. Little differences existed 
between the attitude change versus no-attitude change groups 
with respect to the cost items that were measured (Table 23).
Table 23
Attitude Change and Mean Scores on Cost Items
Mean Scores
Cost Items Attitude Change No Attitude Change
Age 55.20 52.50
Marital Status 1.34 1.40
Family Size 2.38 2.12
Income Decrease 2.94 2.55
Land Ownership 1.30 1.12
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Because of this homogeneity no crucial test of the hypothesis 
could be made. Tentative support or nonsupport would require 
a population much more diverse with respect to the cost items. 
Another reason the cost hypothesis may have not been supported 
is misinterpretation of cost. The concept of social cost was 
not well defined. It was suggested that cost refers to "social 
ties and established patterns of social interaction that are 
severed and disrupted as a result of resettlement"• The cost 
items were designed to assess these disruptions and severences, 
but perhaps they were inadequate. If social cost refers to 
what a person has to give up socially through disruption per­
haps the best indicator is really migration destination and 
behavioral change. Perhaps the more one changes behavior the 
greater the disruption and severance with the past, and there­
fore the greater the social cost. Unfortunately, no empirical 
evidence resulted for this research to test this possibility, 
but additional research might provide such evidence.
Attitude Intensity and Attitude Chanqe
No support exists for the hypothesis that the magnitude 
of dissonance and therefore attitude change is a function of 
intensity with which an attitude is held. This lack of support 
may be a.result of inadequate indicators of intensity, or be­
cause of the history of the case studied. As was pointed out 
in the discussion of the history of Tuttle Creek Reservoir, 
this particular project was characterized by an unusual amount
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of opposition. It appears that most respondents opposed the 
project with an equally high degree of intensity (as measured). 
Sufficient variability in the degree of intensity probably did 
not exist to provide an adequate test. Methodologically, the 
assumption surrounding the indicators of intensity, may not have 
been valid. It was assumed for example that joining an oppo­
sition organization characterized a stronger negative attitude 
than signing a petition. Perhaps both involve the same amount 
of intensity, and opportunity to join, or individual differences 
may account for the form of opposition expression selected by 
an individual. Since no support exists for the hypothesis, a 
very real possibility exists that the theory is inadequate or 
inaccurate in contending that dissonance and the pressure to 
reduce dissonance is a function of the intensity with which an 
attitude is held.
The Utility of the Theory of Cognitive Dissonance
If the test of the utility of a theory is its ability to 
predict, one way of assessing its utility is to establish how 
well it predicts when applied to a "national setting". This 
was one goal of the research to assess the utility of the 
theory of cognitive dissonance. The predictions about atti­
tude change being a function of behavioral change, and about 
attitude change and alienation have been supported when applied 
to the field situation. The hypothesis about cost and attitude 
change was not supported. Although there is a possibility that
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the theory is inadequate with respect to the proposition that 
the magnitude of dissonance is in part a function of cost and 
the intensity with which a cognition is held, such inadequacy 
cannot be shown by this research. When cost and attitude in­
tensity were treated as independent variables, little difference 
among the groups (with regard to the independent variable) 
existed. It may be that such homogeneity is unique to the 
Tuttle Creek resettlement population' or perhaps is applicable 
to many resettlement populations. But as was pointed out, this 
results in a limited ability to make a crucial test.
The theory of cognitive dissonance does appear to have 
utility in making predictions about real-life situations, 
especially when a change in overt behavior is apparent. Compared 
to other theories, its ability to relate behavioral change to 
attitude change is substantial. The evidence resulting from 
this research suggests that in certain situations behavioral
i
change results in attitude change, and this prediction was de­
rived from the theory.
One weakness of the theory is demonstrated by the re­
jection of the attitude intensity and costs hypotheses.
Festinger has failed to consider explicitly situations which 
arise when all individuals hold equally intense attitudes and 
experience similar amounts of cost. Festinger*s theory pre­
dicts that given such a situation one would expect to find the 
same amount of dissonance reduction and change for all
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individuals. The data shows that in the Tuttle Creek situation, 
where the respondents were relatively homogeneous with regard 
to cost and attitude intensity, the amount of dissonance re­
duction varied greatly. If one can assume that the indicators 
used in this research to assess cost and attitude intensity 
are valid, then, given the results, the implication is that the 
theory of cognitive dissonance is inadequate in its considerations 
of cost and attitude intensity.
Summary
It has been found that in the forced-resettlement situ­
ation those persons whose behavior changes the greatest amount 
(as indicated by migration destinations) will change their 
attitudes (about the reservoir project they opposed) the greatest 
amount. Those persons who do not change their behavior and 
attitudes reinforce their negative attitudes through alienation.
No support exists for the contention that attitude change in 
the forced-resettlement situation is a function of social or 
financial cost, or of attitude intensity. This may be a result 
of inadequate theory or of inappropriate methodology. The most 
significant finding is the support which exists for contending 
that there is a direct relationship between behavioral change 
and attitude change.
Research Recommendation
Additional research should be done of reservoir projects 
characterized by slight opposition and those characterized by 
a great deal of opposition in order to make crucial comparisons.
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Research should be done using a design which will permit 
investigating the relationships of social and financial cost 
to attitude change. Before this is done, the concept of social 
cost needs clarification. The results of this study may have 
been confounded by the length of time which elapsed between 
actual resettlement and the time of the study. The time 
lapse involved was from nine to 13 years, depending upon the 
respondent. In order to control for intervening events, addi­
tional research should be done at a time much closer to an 
actual resettlement. Research greatly needed is an investigation 
of the behavioral change which occurs as a result of resettle­
ment or migration. Behavioral change as a result of resettle­
ment was assumed in this thesis. Because it is an assumption, 
it needs to be tested, and this can only be done through an 
in-depth study of forced migration and behavioral change.
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APPENDIX A 
Resettlement Questionnaire
Section I
1. What is your age? ___________
2. Marital status: married single widowed divorced
(Please circle correct answer)
3. (If ever married) How many children do you have? ______
4. Are you: employed full time retired
(Please circle
correct answer) employed part time unemployed
5. What was your approximate average income for the last three 
. years? (Please check one)
   less than $1,999 ___ $6,000 - 8,999
  $2,000 - 3,999 ___ $9,000 - 11,999
  $4,000 - 5,999 ___ $12,000 or more
6. What is the major source of your income? (Please check one)
  salary or wages   dividends & interest
   rents ___ savings
  business earnings ___ pensions
  net farm income ___ Gov. payment
7. What is your occupation?
8. Are you self employed?   Yes   No (Please check)
9. (If retired) What was your main occupation? ______________
10. Do you own ___ or rent   your home? (Please check one)
11. (If a farmer) How many acres do you farm? ______________
12. (If a farmer) What type of farming operation are you en­
gaged in? (Please check the most accurate category)
  cash grain ___ beef livestock
  other field crops   pork livestock
  poultry '   other livestock
  dairy   mixed operation
other
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13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
(If a farmer) Do you own ___ or rent   the majority of
your farm land. (Please check one)
What was your marital status before the construction of 
Tuttle Creek Reservoir? (Please circle correct answer)
married sincrle widowed divorced
What do you consider as your state of healths
excellent good fair poor
How many children did you have living at home before 1955?
Did you own ___ or rent ___  your home prior to the con­
struction of Tuttle Creek Reservoir? (Please check one)
If you were a farmer prior to the construction of Tuttle 
Creek Reservoir, how many acres did you farm? _________
Did you then own ___ or rent ___ the majority of your farm
land? (Please check one)
Before the construction of Tuttle Creek Reservoir, what 
type of farming operation were you engaged in? (Please 
check the most accurate category)
  cash grain____________________ beef livestock
  other field crops_________ ___ pork livestock
 __. poultry____________________ ___ other livestock
  dairy______________________ ___ mixed operation
other
What was your approximate average income for the three-year 
period 1952-1955? (Please check one)
  less than $1,999__________ ___ $6,000 - 8,999
  $2,000 - 3,999________________ $9,000 - 11,999
  $4,000 - 5,999 ___ $12,000 or more
Before the construction of Tuttle Creek Reservoir what was 
the major source of your income? (Please check one)
  salary or wages ___ dividends & interest
 .rents ___ savings
  business earnings ___ pensions
  net farm income___________ _ _  government
Did you oppose the construction of Tuttle Creek Reservoir? 
Yes NO .
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24. If you opposed the construction of Tuttle Creek Reservoir, 
how did you oppose it? (Please check all of the following 
that apply)
- ___ Joined an organization that was against it.
  Signed a petition.
  Wrote a government official.
  Expressed opposition by word of mouth.
  Participated in activities which demonstrated opposition.
  Other _________;_________________________ .___________________
25. What were your main reasons for opposing the construction of 
Tuttle Creek Reservoir? (Please check all categories that 
apply)
  I didn't want to see good farmland ruined.
  I thought it was a waste of the taxpayers' money.
  I didn't think that the hardship and suffering it could
cause would be justifiable.
  I didn't think that big dams were the answer to flood
control•
  I thought it would ruin my source of livelihood.
 Other (Please feel free to comment)
26. Did the construction of Tuttle Creek Reservoir require you 
to move (resettle)? (Please check all the categories that 
apply)
  It required me to move myself and all of my personal
property•
  It required me to move myself and part of my personal
property.
 __  It required me to move only part of my personal property.
  It required me to move to a different home.
  It required me to move to a different farm.
  It required me only to secure new farm land in order to
continue my farm operation.
Other __
27. How many times have you moved since construction of Tuttle 
Creek Reservoir?
28. If the construction of Tuttle Creek Reservoir required you 
to move, where did you first move to? (Name community)
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29. How many years have you resided in the community in which 
. you now live? ____________________
Section II
Most of Section II of the questionnaire contains statements made 
by other people who have experienced resettlement. We are in­
terested in seeing if you agree with what they have said. (Pleae 
circle your answer)
30. THE CHANGES IN MY LIFE THAT WERE BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE CON­
STRUCTION OF TUTTLE CREEK RESERVOIR HAVE BEEN FOR THE BEST.
Strongly agree Agree Don't know Disagree Strongly
disagree
31. LAWS ARE SO OFTEN MADE FOR THE BENEFIT OF SMALL SELFISH
GROUPS THAT A MAN CANNOT RESPECT THE LAW.
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly
disagree
32. ALMOST EVERYONE IS POLITE AND COURTEOUS TO YOU IN OUR 
COMMUNITY.
Very true True Undecided Untrue Definitely untrue
33. IN THE LONG RUN I ’M BETTER OFF BECAUSE TUTTLE CREEK RESER­
VOIR WAS BUILT.
Strongly agree Agree Don’t know Disagree Strongly
disagree
34. DO YOU BELONG TO ANY SOCIAL CLUB OR GROUP SUCH AS A BRIDGE 
CLUB, GYMNASIUM CLASS, DANCING CLUB, SEWING CLUB, OR ANY 
SIMILAR ORGANIZATIONS IN YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD?
Yes No
35. A PERSON CAN PLAN HIS FUTURE SO THAT EVERYTHING WILL COME 
OUT ALL RIGHT IN THE LONG RUN.
Strongly agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly
disagree
36. WOULD YOU RATHER LIVE IN SOME OTHER NEIGHBORHOOD?
Yes N O
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37. REAL FRIENDS ARE HARD TO FIND IN THIS COMMUNITY.
Very true True Undecided Untrue Definitely untrue
38. HOW ABOUT YOUR OWN CASE, ARE YOU SATISFIED WITH THE WAY
THINGS HAVE BEEN WORKING OUT FOR YOU SINCE THE CONSTRUCTION
OF TUTTLE CREEK RESERVOIR?
Very Satisfied Don't know Dissatisfied Very
Satisfied Dissatisfied
39. ABOUT HOW MANY OF THE PEOPLE WHO LIVE IN YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD
WOULD YOU RECOGNIZE BY SIGHT IF YOU SAW THEM IN A LARGE
CROWD?
None Few Some Many Most All
40. THINGS HAVE USUALLY GONE AGAINST ME IN LIFE.
Agree Don't know Disagree
41. HOW SATISFIED ARE YOU WITH YOUR CHANCES OF GETTING MORE 
INCOME?
Very Satisfied Don't know Dissatisfied Very
Satisfied Dissatisfied
42. THERE IS LITTLE USE WRITING TO PUBLIC OFFICIALS BECAUSE 
OFTEN THEY ARE NOT REALLY INTERESTED IN THE PROBLEMS OF THE 
AVERAGE MAN.
Agree Don't know Disagree
43. DO YOUR BEST FRIENDS LIVE IN YOUR PRESENT NEIGHBORHOOD?
None Few Some Many
44. IN SPITE OF WHAT SOME PEOPLE SAY THE LOT OF THE AVERAGE 
MAN IS GETTING WORSE.
Agree Don't know Disagree
45. LOCAL CONCERNS DEAL FAIRLY AND SQUARELY WITH EVERYONE IN 
OUR COMMUNITY.
Very true True Undecided Untrue Definitely untrue
46. HOW WELL ARE YOU SATISFIED WITH YOUR INCOME?
Very Satisfied Don't know Dissatisfied Very
Satisfied , Dissatisfied
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47. AFTER ALL IS DONE AND SAID, TUTTLE CREEK RESERVOIR WAS THE 
BEST THING THAT COULD HAVE HAPPENED TO THE PEOPLE OF THE 
BLUE VALLEY.
Strongly agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly
disagree
48. LIFE IS JUST ONE WORRY AFTER ANOTHER.
Strongly agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly
disagree
49. THESE DAYS, A PERSON DOES NOT REALLY KNOW WHOM HE. CAN COUNT 
ON,
Agree Don't know Disagree
50. MY LIFE IS A LOT BETTER NOW THAN IT WAS BEFORE THE CON­
STRUCTION OF TUTTLE CREEK RESERVOIR.
Strongly agree Agree Don't know Disagree Strongly
disagree
51. LIFE IS JUST A SERIES OF DISAPPOINTMENTS.
Strongly agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly
disagree
52. NOWADAYS A PERSON HAS TO LIVE PRETTY MUCH FOR TODAY AND 
LET TOMORROW TAKE CARE OF ITSELF.
Agree Don't know Disagree
53. THE GOVERNMENT DID THE RIGHT THING WHEN THEY BUILT TUTTLE 
CREEK RESERVOIR.
Strongly agree Agree Don't know Disagree Strongly
disagree
54. TUTTLE CREEK RESERVOIR HAS BEEN A BIG BENEFIT TO MOST OF 
THE PEOPLE WHO LIVE IN THE AREA.
Strongly agree Agree Don't know Disagree Strongly
disagree
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APPENDIX B 
Supporting Letter
THE UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA AT OMAHA 
TUTTLE CREEK RESEARCH PROJECT
Dear Respondent:
We at the University of Nebraska are currently doing research 
in an area in which you can render us valuable assistance. We 
are interested in finding out about the effects of resettlement 
on people who were required to relocate themselves. As our 
Nation grows and more land is required for the construction of 
such things as highways, airports, and reservoirs, we need to 
know ahead of time something about what the effects on people 
will be.
Only you who have a personal experience in resettlement are 
in a position to tell us what the effects are. As we understand 
it, you were required to move as a result of the construction of 
Tuttle Creek Reservoir.
This puts you in the unique situation of allowing us to learn 
from your own personal experience. Enclosed is a questionnaire 
which we would like you to fill out. It will take only a few 
minutes of your time. xLet us assure you that any information 
that you give us will be held in strict confidence. When we 
summarize our findings no reference will be made to you personally. 
Let us re-emphasize this point: ALL INFORMATION IS CONFIDENTIAL.
Your cooperation with us in this research project will be 
most gratefully appreciated. We hope you will return this 
questionnaire as soon as possible.
Sincerely yours,
Vincent J • Webb 
Research Associate
Enel • 
as
APPENDIX C 
Follow-up Letter
Dear Respondent:
Recently you and several other persons from the Tuttle Creek 
area were mailed a research questionnaire dealing with the 
effects of Tuttle Creek Reservoir. We emphasized the need for 
information that only you could give us in the letter that was 
enclosed with your copy of the questionnaire. As was pointed 
out, this information is needed in planning for the future. 
Perhaps you misplaced your copy of the questionnaire or have 
not had the time to fill it out. We have enclosed another copy 
of the questionnaire for you to fill out. We hope you will 
return the completed questionnaire as soon as possible. An 
addressed and stamped envelope has been enclosed for your mail­
ing convenience. All information will be held in strict 
confidentiality.
Sincerely yours,
Vincent J • Webb 
Research Associate
Encl.
